Some shuffled out of the Syrian prison’s gray concrete corridors like zombies rising from a graveyard. Some sobbed as they reunited with long-unseen relatives. Some exulted, crying at newfound freedom from an institution whose brutality earned it the moniker “the human slaughterhouse.”

The fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad opened a Pandora’s Box of revelations about the cruelty of the country’s hated internal security services. Exhibit A is the Saydnaya prison, the military-run complex north of Damascus where tens of thousands of prisoners have been held, tortured, and executed over many years.

Between 2011 and 2018, more 30,000 detainees were executed or died of starvation, medical neglect, or from torture, according to estimates by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a London-based war monitor.

Saydnaya – whose name is sometimes spelled as Sednaya -- was decidedly a Syrian creation, said Philip Luther, head of research for Amnesty International, to jail and punish alleged Islamic extremists initially, and later, political prisoners or anyone perceived to be a threat to the regime.

Since Assad’s flight over the weekend, activists have flocked to the facility throwing its doors open, releasing people, some of whom reportedly have been held for decades, hammering down walls, and unearthing the horrifying details of the facility’s operations.

“In short, I’m not aware that the design or operation of Saydnaya prison was guided or inspired by outside entities such as Iran or Russia,” Luther told RFE/RL. “The operation of the prison seems to have responded to the particular security objectives of the Syrian authorities.”

In the hours after the prison’s gates were breached, thousands of people flocked to the facility, many looking for news of relatives.

Other videos verified by RFE/RL showed people, some appearing to be rebels or insurgents, scouring through paper administrative files, while scores of men thronged corridors of the complex celebrating their release.

Other men appeared confused and befuddled inside the complex's first floor, apparently not understanding they had been freed.

"Don't be scared! The regime has fallen! Don't be scared! You are free!" says the narrator of another video verified by RFE/RL. "Leave, old man! Thank God you are safe! You are free!"

"I haven't had a biscuit in 9 years," another man said joyfully, as he also fed another inmate.

Rumors that the complex contained vast, subterranean cell blocks drew people with engineering and demolition equipment, to sledgehammer concrete walls. The White Helmets, a well-known humanitarian organization, brought in jackhammers to drill into floors.

The group issued a statement on December 9 saying that it had not discovered any “unopened or hidden areas in the facility.”

In 2017, the U.S. State Department publicly accused the Syrian government of building a crematorium at Saydnaya, and prison officials killing as many as 50 people day, mainly by hanging, the bodies being dumped in a mass grave. U.S. officials accused Syria of apparently conducting the killings with “unconditional support of Russia and Iran", though officials later qualified that there was no evidence that Russia or Iran were involved with the crematorium.

"This is from Saydnaya prison. This is the food that they're serving. "Those are the cells," one man narrates in another unverified video as he films the interior of the prison. "They feed them cabbage."

Prisoner survivors, relatives, and activists have reported that some inmates had been held in Saydnaya for years -- if not decades. One video that circulated widely but RFE/RL could not independently verify purported to show one man who was incapable of speaking and who had been held in the facility for 13 years.

The jubilation at Saydnaya was echoed elsewhere around Damascus and other cities, in scenes of other prisoners being released and exulting at their freedom.

“Ten years in prison! Ten years!” one newly freed prisoner yelled on December 8, as a crowd of men ran past the Ministry of Energy in Damascus.”

In one video that circulated widely on social media, an unnamed woman who purportedly spent years in various Syrian prisons is shown sobbing as she is reunited with her two young children.

Riyad Avlar, who spent 12 years inside the prison and is now the co-founder of the Turkey-based Association of Detainees and The Missing in Sednaya Prison, likened the facility to what he’s read about North Korea prisons.

“What people should understand is the Assad regime was like Hitler, like the Nazis. Absolutely as bad,” Avlar told RFE/RL.

WASHINGTON -- As US President Donald Trump signals an agreement with Iran could be within reach, major questions remain over Tehran's nuclear ambitions, regional security, and the durability of any future deal.

Amid continuing tensions across the Middle East -- from southern Lebanon to the Strait of Hormuz -- RFE/RL spoke with Lisa Gable, a former US ambassador who served during the George W. Bush administration and is now the chairwoman of World In 2050, about the prospects for diplomacy, the challenges of verification, and the broader geopolitical stakes.

RFE/RL: One of the biggest questions is whether diplomacy can stay on track amid ongoing tensions and potential cease-fire violations. How vulnerable are the current talks to developments on the ground, particularly when a single military incident can quickly change the political environment?

Gable: It can, but we haven't seen it do so yet. One of the things you see in this particular situation that is very different from what we've had in the past when dealing with the Middle East and Iran is that, through the work of the first Trump administration and the Abraham Accords, you are seeing a much stronger form of communication, engagement, and conversation with allies in the region.

If we think through the history of that region, the United States has never had a stronger relationship with countries like Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Having those countries be part of the Abraham Accords and having those relationships develop has changed the dynamics of what we're seeing today.

RFE/RL: Iranian officials have publicly pointed to mixed signals from Washington. Can diplomacy succeed when both sides question each other's intentions?

Gable: More sophisticated players realize there are multiple levels of negotiation. You've got people talking at different levels in different governments and in different areas of the region.

We have military conversations going on. We have public conversations that guide public discourse, but they're not always fully representative of everything going on behind the scenes.

I would be reluctant to make any prediction right now and would actually question who could, given the different levels of conversation that are taking place.

RFE/RL: Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently suggested Iran is discussing issues it previously refused to negotiate. Do you see that as evidence of meaningful movement, or is it too early to interpret such signals as a breakthrough?

Gable: It's too early to predict. We've seen different points in the conversation, and we've seen reversals in the conversation. But I have great respect for Secretary Rubio. As I mentioned, there are different levels of conversation taking place.

What we also don't have a full grasp of is who's really in charge in Iran. We've had a lot of changes in the hierarchy, and it would not be surprising to discover that some players in the country might be having one set of conversations while others are having different conversations.

At this stage of the game, I would listen to what Rubio is saying and use that as guidance.

RFE/RL: If the United States continues to emphasize sanctions relief and access to international commerce, while Iran remains focused on economic recovery, which side currently holds the stronger negotiating position?

Gable: It comes down to the unity of allied nations involved in this conversation. The commercial aspects of this are affected by the Strait of Hormuz, but any disruption there affects many countries. It's not only affecting the United States; it's also affecting China and Russia. That works to our benefit, but at the same time, that level of basic commercial activity -- particularly the movement of ships -- is going to be the primary concern for everyone.

RFE/RL: How important is bipartisan support if any agreement is going to survive beyond the current political cycle?

Gable: We're entering a very highly contested election in November. To the degree that we can get some level of bipartisan support, we are always stronger. That vote [NOTE: The US House of Representatives approved a war powers resolution on June 3 aimed at curbing Trump's military campaign against Iran] didn't take place with a broad number of Republicans, but you did see some Republicans move over to the Democratic side. That is a signal.

The question is: What conversations are going on in the background as everyone seeks a resolution that brings peace, security, and safety, while also giving us the financial flexibility we need within the markets?

RFE/RL: Looking beyond Washington and Tehran, which external actors -- whether Gulf states, European allies, or regional mediators -- are most critical to turning a temporary arrangement into lasting peace?

Gable: The Gulf states. As I said earlier, the Trump administration deserves credit for building closer relationships within the Gulf during the first Trump administration. The European allies, to some degree -- except for countries in the Balkans, Poland, and some others -- have tried to maintain their distance, which is very unfortunate because we are essentially protecting their rights and access to energy, upon which they are very reliant.

I would hope our European allies would be more supportive of any American initiative, but they have not been to date.

RFE/RL: Should the ultimate goal be a narrow agreement focused solely on the nuclear issue, or a broader framework that also addresses regional security, proxy groups, and economic normalization? Which approach offers the best chance of lasting stability?

Gable: It's a multistep process, and again, it depends on veracity and the ability to trust. I go back to Ronald Reagan's phrase: "Trust, but verify." Can we verify what's happening on the nuclear front? At the same time, can we monitor the actions of the Iranians as they relate to the United States and allied countries like Israel?

Israel has faced some of the greatest challenges over the last several years from Iran-backed proxies, and so we'll be watching that very closely.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

When it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia expected the fall of Kyiv within days.

In waging a bombing campaign of Iran in late February, the United States and Israel anticipated the rapid collapse of the Islamic republic.

But in both cases, overwhelming military power failed to defeat the smaller and weaker side in the conflict. Instead, Ukraine and Iran reshaped the battlefield with cheap, domestically produced drones.

The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have given rise to asymmetric drone warfare, experts say. Compensating for shortages of missiles and the lack of a modern air force, militarily weaker actors are increasingly using drones to even the playing field.

"Drone warfare is new in the sense that it doesn't truly replace conventional military means but rather modifies their uses," said Clement Molin, an analyst at the France-based think tank Atum Mundi.

"If drones are used so extensively by Ukraine and Russia, it is primarily due to a lack of air superiority capabilities or missiles. We see this in the Middle East, where states have been able to achieve almost total air superiority over Iran," he added.

Molin said aircraft, tanks, logistics, and infantry are still crucial in modern warfare. But he said the role of drones in military strategy is "progressively strengthening."

"Drones will conduct autonomous missions guided by AI. UGV [unmanned ground vehicle] drones will be able to replace logistics or conduct assaults. And naval drones will enable surface and underwater warfare, and even, as is already the case, serve as 'drone carriers.'"

'Low-Cost Attrition'

The United States and Israel launched a bombing campaign of Iran on February 28, striking military and nuclear sites, hitting the country's industrial base, and assassinating dozens of Iranian political and military officials.

Lacking a modern air force and air defenses, Iran responded by firing thousands of ballistic missiles and kamikaze Shahed drones at Israel, US military and diplomatic facilities in Persian Gulf, and key energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait -- key US allies.

By threatening and attacking international shipping, Iran also brought maritime traffic to a virtual standstill in the Strait of Hormuz, a key artery for global oil and gas supplies, giving it significant leverage over its neighbors in the Persian Gulf and the global economy.

Costing as little as $7,000 each, Iran's drones imposed significant economic and operational costs on the Persian Gulf states, despite high interception rates. Iran fired an estimated 4,000 Shahed-136 and Arash-2 drones until a cease-fire went into effect on April 8.

Iran's drone attacks "paralyzed shipping, damaged air and missile defense radars, slashed gas exports, and forced expensive alert postures," said Farzin Nadimi, an Iran defense expert at the Washington Institute.

"Iran's one-way attack drones demonstrated in the 2026 conflict that even heavily degraded forces can maintain offensive capability and probably even shift the balance through persistent, low-cost attrition," he added.

Ukraine's inexpensive, domestically produced drones have played a major role in its war against Russia.

Drones have not only been key to Kyiv fighting Russian forces to a near stalemate. Away from the front line, Ukrainian drones have struck Russia's naval fleets in the Black and Baltic seas, hit Russian airfields and military sites, and disrupted Russia's war economy by striking major oil refineries.

Lagging in its drone capabilities at first, Russia acquired thousands of units and technology from Iran, and then developed its own homegrown production.

For both Russia and Ukraine, the entire war has been transformed by drones, experts said: kamikaze Shahed drones, heavy-lift supply drones, first-person-view drones, drones flown by fiber-optic cable.

'Irregular Groups'

Nonstate actors, including militant groups in the Middle East, are also increasingly using drones against regular armies. They include Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthi rebels.

Hezbollah is both a militant group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon. It is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, although the European Union has only blacklisted its armed wing.

Hezbollah has used fiber-optic drones -- first pioneered by Russian soldiers and now ubiquitous in Ukraine -- during the current war with Israel.

In the past month, Hezbollah militants have killed three IDF soldiers and one Israeli civilian using kamikaze drones controlled through kilometers of fiber-optic cables, highlighting the vulnerability of even the world's most advanced militaries to the cheap drone innovation.

Unlike radio-controlled drones, which are vulnerable to electronic jamming and require a clear line of sight to a transmitter, fiber-optic drones can be navigated to virtually anywhere there is space to fly.

Meanwhile, the Houthis have waged maritime drone and missile campaigns that have disrupted global shipping in the Red Sea.

"Groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis already have effectively shown that they can use asymmetric strategies, based on cheap drones and missiles, to impose costs on rival militaries," said Steven Feldstein of the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"The Houthis are a classic example of an irregular group that over time have developed a sophisticated drone and missile program that has created significant havoc in the region," he added.

Experts say both groups have used Iranian designs and know-how, commercial components mainly sourced from China, and battlefield lessons from the war in Ukraine.

US President Donald Trump said the United States will win the conflict with Iran either "militarily or on paper,” referring to the fitful negotiations with Tehran, and he suggested he could meet with Iran's reclusive supreme leader "if it was to make a deal.”

"We're going to win one way or the other," Trump told reporters at the White House.

"It's going to be militarily or on paper."

Trump also said he had no desire to meet with Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba ‌Khamenei, who has not been seen since the outbreak of violence on February 28 and was reportedly seriously injured in US-Israeli air strikes.

However, Trump added if the two sides reached ‌a deal, it was possible the two leaders would meet and added: "If it happened...I'd be respectful."

"I don't want to meet, but if I did meet, I'd be honored to meet him," Trump said.

"But if we make a deal, it's possible that I would meet him. I'd be OK with that."

Trump on June 3 had said Khamenei was "involved, absolutely" in negotiations, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio a day earlier said that "there are indications out there that he is increasingly engaging at some level."

Trump: US Could Resume Military Operations

Trump also said US forces would resume operations if American troops were killed in any Iranian strikes during the current cease-fire. Tehran and the US have exchanged occasional air strikes in recent days, the latest being Iran's attacks on Kuwait's international airport that killed one person and injured 63 on June 3.

Trump was speaking at the White House on June 4 to reporters on a wide variety of subjects, including the Ukraine war, Cuba, and global trade issues.

Amid the shaky cease-fire in the Middle East and on-and-off peace negotiations, Trump said the United States ⁠did not need a deal with Tehran to get Iran's supply of enriched uranium out of the ⁠country.

"We could get ‌it right now. I don't think they could stop us if we wanted, but there's no reason to. ‌It's entombed," he told reporters, referring to the material that could be used to build a nuclear weapon.

Trump claimed that the uranium was under surveillance. "We have cameras on it," he said, without elaborating.

Mohsen Rezaei, adviser to Iran's ‌supreme leader, said the ⁠current ⁠draft ‌of the memorandum of understanding being negotiated ⁠to end the war ‌has ambiguities that need to be clarified.

He claimed that Trump seeks to pressure ‌Tehran to accept ⁠his terms ‌and keep Tehran's conditions in a vague state.

Progress In Lebanon Amid Violence?

Trump also said he believed progress was ⁠being made between ‌Israel and Lebanon and that Lebanon deserved to have peace and that he "actually spoke to Hezbollah about it."

Iran-backed Hezbollah, a militant group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon, is considered a terrorist organization by the US, while the European Union has blacklisted its armed wing but not its political branch.

Trump on June 1 also said he had spoken to Hezbollah, but the White House later clarified that it was through intermediaries.

Given that Hezbollah is a designated terror group, no US ​president has previously acknowledged having spoken to the group, directly or through intermediaries.

Hezbollah on June 4 rejected a new cease-fire in Lebanon, and Israel said it would not withdraw troops from the country, undermining US efforts to halt fighting there as part of a wider peace deal with Iran. Hezbollah has not been a direct participant in the talks involving the US, Israel, and the Lebanese government.

Trump told reporters he had also spoken to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and said that "‌I think progress ⁠is made. ‌It's been going on for a long time, you know."

"It would be really nice if Lebanon could have some peace," he said. "Lebanon has been under attack for so many years and always like an underdog, and it would be really nice if it could end."

Tehran has made a Lebanon truce one of its conditions for a peace deal with Washington. It has suggested it could intervene directly if Israel forces maintain their ferocious attacks there.

With reporting by RFE/RL's Radio Farda, AFP, and Reuters

WASHINGTON -- The US House of Representatives has passed a largely symbolic resolution aimed at limiting President Donald Trump's ability to continue military operations against Iran, highlighting growing unease among congressional lawmakers over the conflict. At the same time, senior administration officials have insisted the confrontation is effectively over, even as military exchanges continue across the region.

RFE/RL spoke with Jake Sotiriadis, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security who also advises the US State Department, where he trains diplomats in strategic foresight and geopolitical futures at the Foreign Service Institute, about whether these developments could signal the beginning of a diplomatic off-ramp between Washington and Tehran or merely a pause in a confrontation that still carries a significant risk of escalation.

RFE/RL: What do these mixed signals tell us about where this crisis stands?

Jake Sotiriadis: The administration is following a tactic we've seen previous administrations use when it comes to defining the status of a particular conflict. The House vote is largely symbolic -- it's not a binding resolution that's going to limit the administration's ability to do anything. In the unlikely event that it passes in the Senate in its current form, it still doesn't really have any bearing on the president's ability to conduct military operations.

Symbolically, this is obviously not a good look for the administration. This is not what the administration would like because it is a reflection of the House. This is also in line with current polling. The vast majority of the American public being polled is not in favor of the conflict right now.

For legal reasons, the administration is saying the conflict is officially over. It's really hard in practical terms to look at where we are right now -- with double-digit drones and missiles [targeting] Kuwait International Airport [on June 3], with American forces having launched attacks on Qeshm Island, with the Iranians and Americans trading missile attacks -- and say we are completely out of the woods. This is a very volatile situation, and at any moment you could have an escalation in military activity.

RFE/RL: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Iran has been significantly weakened militarily and economically. How do analysts determine whether a campaign has genuinely changed a state's behavior rather than simply degraded its capabilities?

Sotiriadis: I would suggest Iran's behavior hasn't necessarily changed all that much. This is a core issue when you look at the conflict. The question is whether you're going to be able to change Iran through regime change. I think that's off the table right now.

Yes, Iran's military capabilities have been degraded. Essentially, its navy is nonexistent. The problem with saying that is what the Iranians are demonstrating: You don't need a large conventional navy to control a choke point like the Strait of Hormuz. They're using asymmetric means. They're using a large inventory of drones that they still have, and they're using missile forces they still possess as well.

That's why, in whatever negotiation takes place, if there isn't a limit on Iran's ballistic missile program...that's a capability Iran can use to strike not only throughout the Middle East region but beyond it, as we saw when they fired toward Diego Garcia a few months ago.

RFE/RL: Iran's latest strikes reportedly hit infrastructure around Kuwait's airport and caused casualties. What do these attacks tell us about Tehran's remaining ability to project force despite claims that many of its military assets have been degraded?

Sotiriadis: When it comes to striking targets like Kuwait's airport, oil refineries, or military bases in the region, Iran still has that capability. It still has a large inventory of drones that hasn't been destroyed, and it still has missiles that it can and has been using.

Interestingly, the Iranians are now using the same argument that the Americans have been using: Iran said today that it struck Kuwait in self-defense because it believes attacks were launched from there. The US has similarly argued that strikes on coastal missile and drone sites were carried out in self-defense. S

RFE/RL: Looking specifically at the Strait of Hormuz and shipping lanes, what indicators will you be watching to determine whether the region is moving toward stabilization or renewed confrontation?

Sotiriadis: One of the biggest threats right now is that the Iranians have mined the strait. That's a huge risk to both commercial and military vessels. Any agreement to reopen the strait would require Iran to remove those mines.

This is where help from America's European allies would be useful. If we saw some form of European maritime force assisting with countermine operations, helping clear mines, or escorting vessels, that would be a positive indicator. It would also send a strong message that there is a broader international coalition working together on the issue.

The Europeans have a significant stake in this. Between 12 and 20 percent of their energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians have realized through this conflict that, while much attention is focused on their nuclear program, one of their greatest sources of leverage is geography. They've long understood that closing the Strait of Hormuz was an option. Now they see it as perhaps their most powerful tool.

RFE/RL: Are we witnessing the beginning of a durable diplomatic off-ramp between Washington and Tehran, or merely a pause in a confrontation that still carries a significant risk of escalation?

Sotiriadis: There's always a risk of renewed military operations when things are this volatile. But what options are really left for the administration? One option is simply to walk away, but that would not be a good look. Another option is to launch a more extensive bombing campaign to pressure Iran into negotiations.

Both sides would prefer negotiations. The challenge is that there are still too many irreconcilable differences; whether it's the status of enriched uranium or the $25 billion in reparations Iran is reportedly seeking, those demands are not going to be acceptable to Washington. Likewise, what the US is demanding is not going to be acceptable to Tehran.

Until we get some sort of interim agreement -- perhaps a 60-day pause designed to create space for a longer-term solution -- we're likely to remain in this limbo. I do believe this could continue for a few more months.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

The US House of Representatives approved a war powers resolution aimed at curbing President Donald Trump's military campaign against Iran, delivering a bipartisan rebuke to the administration even as Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted that US operations against Tehran had ended.

The House voted 215-208 on June 3 in favor of the measure, with four Republicans joining all Democrats in support.

The resolution, introduced by Representative Gregory Meeks of New York, directs Trump to remove US armed forces from hostilities with Iran unless Congress formally declares war or authorizes the use of military force.

The measure now heads to the Senate, where lawmakers are considering a separate war powers resolution. Even if approved by both chambers, Trump is expected to challenge efforts to limit his authority, and the House measure itself is largely viewed as symbolic because it does not carry the force of law.

Bipartisan Vote Signals Growing Congressional Pushback

The vote marked the strongest congressional rebuke yet of a conflict that has stretched beyond three months and fueled concerns about its economic and geopolitical consequences.

In a statement after the vote, Meeks argued that the military campaign had failed to achieve its stated objectives and had instead damaged diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving disputes over Iran's nuclear program.

"If anything, it has pushed a diplomatic resolution of Iran's nuclear program further away," he said.

The New York Democrat also pointed to rising fuel prices and the financial cost of the conflict, saying Americans were paying substantially more for gasoline while bearing the expense of a war that many oppose.

House Democratic leaders echoed those concerns, arguing that the conflict contradicted Trump's campaign pledges to avoid foreign wars and reduce costs for American households.

Republican leaders, however, maintained that the military campaign did not constitute a war requiring congressional authorization and warned restricting presidential authority could benefit Iran's leadership.

Still, opposition within Republican ranks has grown. Representatives Thomas Massie of Kentucky, Brian Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania, Tom Barrett of Michigan, and Warren Davidson of Ohio broke with most of their party to support the measure.

Rubio Defends Administration's Strategy

Hours before the House vote, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio defended the administration's handling of the conflict during testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

"We're no longer conducting sustained strikes inside of Iran to degrade their military, because Epic Fury is over," Rubio said, referring to the US military campaign. He added that Washington had achieved its objectives.

Rubio also argued the administration's goal had never been regime change in Tehran.

"We would love to see a change in Iran, and that they be governed by people, but that was not the goal of our mission," he told lawmakers.

The secretary of state said the US sought to eliminate Iran's ability to threaten the region with large-scale missile and drone attacks, which he argued would have reduced international leverage over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

Sanctions Relief Tied To Nuclear Concessions

Rubio also said any easing of US sanctions on Iran would depend on concessions regarding its nuclear program.

"They are not going to get any sanctions relief of any kind unless they get rid of enrichment and get rid of the highly enriched uranium," he told lawmakers.

According to Rubio, discussions between Washington and Tehran remain focused on the framework for future negotiations. He said Iran had shown greater willingness to discuss uranium enrichment than in previous talks but had not yet made commitments that satisfy US demands.

"A few months ago they refused to discuss the issues of both enrichment and the highly enriched uranium," Rubio said. "I think now, in some of the papers that have been exchanged back and forth, it's clearly addressed, but we still don't have final sign-off from their system, as of this morning (June 3)."

Rubio added that the United States would only consider lifting its maritime blockade if Iran restores freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

The administration has argued that the conflict effectively ended after Trump ordered a cease-fire in early April. The White House has also dismissed the House resolution as an unconstitutional attempt to limit executive authority, saying there are currently no active hostilities from which US forces must be withdrawn.

The Senate has not yet scheduled a final vote on its own war powers measure.

The United States and Iran exchanged missile and drone attacks early on June 3 as their fragile cease-fire hangs in the balance amid uncertainty over peace talks.

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said its forces successfully intercepted multiple Iranian ballistic missiles and drones during incidents across the Middle East on June 3.

CENTCOM reported that three missiles fired at Bahrain were intercepted by US and Bahraini air defense systems, while two missiles aimed at Kuwait fell short or broke apart in flight.

However, authorities in Kuwait said the "brutal" Iranian attacks left at least one person dead and at least 63 others injured, in addition to forcing the closure of Kuwait International Airport and damaging "vital installations," including diplomatic missions.

"Iran's blatant acts of aggression...escalate tensions, undermine security and stability of the region, and constitute a flagrant violation of international law," Kuwait's Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) confirmed the attack, saying it was made in retaliation for previous US strikes in recent days.

The incident came ahead of a visit by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Jarrah Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to Washington, where he was expected to meet with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on June 4, RFE/RL learned from a diplomatic source.

CENTCOM also said US forces shot down three Iranian one-way attack drones that were said to be targeting civilian shipping in regional waters.

In response, US forces conducted what CENTCOM described as "self-defense strikes" against an Iranian military ground control station on Qeshm Island, which is located in the Strait of Hormuz.

Ongoing Peace Negotiations

The developments come as peace negotiations between the United States and Iran are about to enter their third month without yielding any concrete results.

Speaking to the New York Post's Pod Force One podcast, US President Donald Trump said Tehran has agreed to a major concession by saying it will not seek to obtain a nuclear weapon, adding that the situation was rapidly evolving.

In the interview, Trump said Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei was involved in negotiations and approving Tehran's stance over the issues. Khamenei has not been seen in public since before US and Israeli air strikes killed his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and several other family members on February 28.

Mojtaba Khamenei, who was named the new supreme leader on March 8, was reportedly severely wounded in the strikes, raising questions as to who was actually leading Iran.

"I would like to meet him, and we probably will meet at some point, depending on how it all works out," Trump said.

While there was no immediate confirmation from Iranian authorities on Trump's comments about nuclear weapons, Tehran has been vague about where the negotiations stand.

Earlier in the week, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said that the talks were indeed ongoing but warned against "speculation," saying Tehran could not judge the negotiating process until there was a clear result.

The latest draft of potential agreement between the countries, reported by US media, was said to extend the cease-fire by 60 days, call for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and establish a framework for renewed nuclear negotiations.

The deal would also potentially allow Iran to access billions of dollars in frozen assets through sanctions relief if diplomatic progress continues.

However, later the US media reported that Trump has requested changes to the proposed agreement. The revisions reportedly concerned the status of the Strait of Hormuz and the disposal of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile.

On June 2, Rubio said that no sanctions on Iran will be lifted in exchange for Iran agreeing to open the Strait of Hormuz. "That's not been discussed. That's not been offered," he told a Senate committee hearing.

With reporting by Reuters and AFP.

WASHINGTON -- Diplomatic efforts to contain the widening Middle East crisis entered a critical phase this week as US officials sought to keep alive negotiations with Iran amid mounting regional tensions.

On June 2, the same day Israeli and Lebanese officials held a fourth round of US-mediated talks in Washington, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Congress he remained optimistic that nuclear negotiations with Tehran could resume despite growing uncertainty over a fragile cease-fire and renewed threats surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. Rubio also insisted that sanctions relief would remain tied to Iran's nuclear program and not to any reopening of key shipping routes.

Meanwhile, Iran-linked actors across the region continued to test the limits of the uneasy truce, with Hezbollah rejecting a "partial cease-fire" proposal and US military officials reporting new Iranian missile activity against regional targets.

To better understand the state of the Iran talks and whether the region is moving toward a new strategic order, RFE/RL spoke with Dania Arayssi, program head and senior analyst at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, whose work focuses on Lebanon and the broader Middle East.

RFE/RL: As Washington pursues both Israeli-Lebanese talks and broader negotiations with Iran, how significant are today's meetings? Do they represent real progress, or are they largely symbolic at this stage?

Dania Arayssi: Iran always likes to bring Lebanon into any negotiation with the US, but I think it's important to distinguish these two elements. What's going on in Lebanon is that the Lebanese government is trying to reclaim its sovereignty, its territory, and control over its borders, and that's something it has been trying to do for a very long time.

But I think Hezbollah, as a terrorist organization in Lebanon, is trying to follow orders from Tehran, and the continuation of launching missiles and strikes on Israel often comes at times when there are slowdowns or setbacks in negotiations between Iran and the US. Tehran is using Hezbollah as an element in Lebanon to sustain pressure on Israel. The Lebanese government has been very clear that it wants to work with Israel to resolve these issues and disarm Hezbollah. I think today's meetings were productive and positive, and I expected them to be because both parties agree on the same objective.

My expectation is that we are going to see Lebanese authorities working with Israel, under US mediation, to share intelligence on Hezbollah, particularly regarding weapons and arms stockpiles in Lebanon. This could help achieve mutually beneficial goals. I also expect the cease-fire between Lebanon and Israel to continue and potentially be expanded, with the US playing a key mediating role.

When it comes to Iran, I think Tehran is also trying to use Lebanon as leverage in negotiations. Iranian officials have made statements suggesting that Israeli military activity in Lebanon affects the pace of negotiations with Washington. Again, Lebanon is being used as a tool to slow down talks and complicate efforts to resolve the broader conflict. The US has been clear that Lebanon should not be part of these negotiations and that it is a separate sovereign country.

That being said, I do not expect negotiations with Iran to produce a meaningful outcome unless there is movement on the nuclear file. The current administration proposed a 20-year freeze on Iran's nuclear activities, which Tehran rejected. Any future nuclear agreement will also need to take Israel's security concerns into account because Iran is viewed as a major threat to Israel from a geographic and strategic standpoint.

Hezbollah's Mixed Messages

RFE/RL: Hezbollah has alternated between signaling openness to a cease-fire and rejecting key elements of proposed arrangements. How should we interpret these mixed messages, and what do they reveal about the pressures facing the group?

Arayssi: Hezbollah is divided internally over what peace should look like and how to pursue it. On one side, the group receives orders and directives from Iran regarding retaliation and military operations against Israel. On the other side, Hezbollah also has a constituency inside Lebanon -- people who support the group and have elected representatives linked to it and who are increasingly tired of this prolonged conflict.

So I think there are elements within Hezbollah that genuinely want a cease-fire and an end to the conflict. At the same time, they have to balance conflicting demands and pressures. With the pressure being applied by the Lebanese government and public opinion, I think Hezbollah will ultimately have to accept a cease-fire.

One of the key disputes during previous negotiations was over sequencing -- whether Hezbollah should stop launching missiles first, whether Israel should stop first, or whether both sides should halt operations simultaneously.

Hezbollah is realizing that its own constituency, particularly Lebanon's Shi'ite population, has been among the groups most affected by the conflict. Continuing the war risks further harm to its own community, which is why I think acceptance of a cease-fire is becoming increasingly necessary.

RFE/RL: From a political, economic, and strategic perspective, can Hezbollah afford to reject a peace deal at this stage? Or is its hard-line rhetoric partly aimed at masking internal weaknesses?

Arayssi: From a political economy standpoint, I don't think Hezbollah can afford this war. One major source of Hezbollah's funding has traditionally come through Syria, including smuggling networks and financial support linked to Iran. With tighter border controls and changes in Syria, Hezbollah has lost many of those revenue streams. The Lebanese government has also shut down a number of Hezbollah-linked financial institutions, including Al-Qard Al-Hassan. In addition, many Hezbollah officials and affiliates remain under US sanctions.

Beyond that, Hezbollah no longer has the financial capacity it once had to support displaced communities affected by fighting. People who have had to leave their villages often lack adequate support. Some are living in tents or temporary shelters and are increasingly frustrated. Even Hezbollah fighters are facing shortages of resources and support. Taken together, these factors suggest Hezbollah lacks the political and economic means to sustain a prolonged war and will eventually have to accept a cease-fire.

RFE/RL: Who is making the key decisions in Lebanon today? Are the officials participating in Washington talks the real decision-makers?

Arayssi: I think we are witnessing something very important in Lebanon: genuine power-sharing. Decision-making is no longer concentrated in the hands of a single actor. It involves the president, the prime minister, and Lebanon's diplomatic leadership working together.

For the first time in a long time, we are seeing collective decision-making focused on peace, security, and reconstruction. Previously, power was heavily concentrated among Hezbollah and its allies. The emergence of a broader governing consensus is a significant development.

This is one reason why the US has worked to prevent further escalation in Beirut. There is a genuine belief among Western governments, particularly in Washington, that Lebanon is attempting to reclaim authority from Hezbollah and reduce Iranian influence.

RFE/RL: Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is becoming increasingly involved in decision-making. What does that tell us about the stability of the Iranian system?

Arayssi: I think there is considerable uncertainty about decision-making inside Iran. Leadership structures have been disrupted, and there appears to be less clarity about who is responsible for major decisions and negotiations.

In a wartime environment, replacing senior figures and maintaining continuity becomes very difficult. Security concerns further complicate internal communication and coordination.

As a result, decision-making appears more concentrated among a smaller number of individuals, which can make consensus-building and negotiations more difficult.

RFE/RL: Is Washington negotiating with a unified Iranian leadership, or are internal divisions becoming more visible

Arayssi: There are divisions within Iran. There are individuals who favor accepting certain terms and pursuing a more pragmatic relationship with the international community. There are also more hard-line figures who continue to emphasize Iran's right to maintain a nuclear program.

These competing views create challenges for negotiations and make it harder to reach a final agreement.

A New Regional Order?

RFE/RL: Looking at the broader picture, do these crises point toward the emergence of a new regional order, or should each issue be addressed separately?

Arayssi: I think the US needs to recognize that a new regional order is emerging. Iran is an important regional actor with its own interests and worldview. The challenge is to build mechanisms of trust and communication that reduce risks and prevent conflict.

We are already seeing discussions about civilian nuclear capabilities elsewhere in the region, including in Saudi Arabia. That means the focus should be on building frameworks that ensure nuclear technology is not used to threaten other countries.

Ultimately, regional stability depends on sustained dialogue, communication, and cooperation among major actors.

RFE/RL: Some opposition groups in Iran once received significant attention abroad but seem less visible today. Why

Arayssi: I think there is growing recognition that political change in Iran must be driven by Iranians themselves. The US does not want to be perceived as imposing a political outcome or choosing Iran's future leadership.

There is also recognition that external attempts to engineer political transitions elsewhere in the region have produced mixed results. Policymakers are cautious about repeating those experiences.

If Iran's political future changes, it will need to be through a process that reflects the will of the Iranian people themselves rather than having outside actors select leaders on their behalf.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

WASHINGTON -- As Washington and Tehran appear to edge toward a preliminary agreement, renewed fighting in Lebanon has cast uncertainty over the diplomatic track. Iran has warned that continued cease-fire violations in Lebanon could derail indirect talks with the United States, while President Donald Trump insists negotiations are still moving ahead at a "rapid pace."

RFE/RL spoke with Kirsten Fontenrose, former senior director for the Gulf region at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, about whether diplomacy can survive the latest escalation, how Iran is trying to link the Lebanon and nuclear tracks, and what signs she will be watching for in the coming days.

RFE/RL: Forty-eight hours ago, the story appeared to be that Washington and Tehran were moving closer to an agreement. Today, the question is whether the talks can survive the crisis in Lebanon. What changed, and how concerned should we be that diplomacy is slipping away?

Kirsten Fontenrose: I actually think the changes during this weekend are a sign that diplomacy is still very alive. We saw developments on two different fronts. First, there is the question of Lebanon. Israel was pushing harder into southern Lebanon, further than it had before, and was taking territory it once held between 1992 and 2000, when it first pushed Hezbollah out of that crusader castle Hezbollah had been using to attack Israel.

We then saw President [Donald] Trump ask Israel not to go into Beirut because there is concern on the diplomatic front that Israel holding some of the territory it has been retaking would stop negotiations and eliminate the chance for peace. President Trump has essentially said: "Please do not go into Beirut. There are too many populations we do not want to lose there. We are not looking to scare the Lebanese people. This is between Israel and Hezbollah, not between Israel and the Lebanese people, not the population of Beirut. Dahieh is one little neighborhood. Let's handle this another way." That means diplomacy is still alive. It does not mean this is done, but it at least means the discussion is happening.

The other change was that President Trump held a meeting at the White House on [May 29] to discuss the draft framework being circulated. A lot of opponents of the draft were interested in what would come out of that meeting, and what came out of it was essentially a non-decision. On [May 31], following that meeting, President Trump sent a list of requirements for a memorandum of understanding framework to interlocutors to deliver to Iran. What we understand is that this version is a little more stringent. The asks have become harder. President Trump asked some tough questions during the meeting. For example, he questioned the loose language surrounding the nuclear program. If Iran agrees to export or downblend its enriched uranium, what happens if sanctions are relieved or the blockade is removed and revenues begin flowing? What prevents Iran from simply purchasing a nuclear weapon from another country?

Those of us who follow nuclear issues think about places such as North Korea, China, or even Pakistan, depending on global conditions. As a result, the team worked on tightening the language. There are now more specifics in the US draft regarding where and how enriched uranium would be exported, and more specifics regarding reopening the strait. From what we understand, it is more of a reward-for-action structure. Iran will not receive the economic lifeline it is seeking before it takes action to address international concerns.

Those who have watched Iran for a long time advised the president that once Tehran gets that economic lifeline -- once sanctions are lifted or the blockade is removed -- it will no longer make concessions on other issues. You will not see concessions on the nuclear program, missile program, or support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, or militias in Iraq. The president listened to those concerns. So now you are seeing the US side say it is not willing to separate the blockade issue entirely and restore revenue flows without guarantees regarding the framework for follow-on negotiations. For example, it may not be enough simply to restart nuclear talks after 30 days. There may need to be concrete results. All of that depends on Tehran's response.

We do not know when to expect that response because, as far as Washington understands, the remnants of the regime are difficult to reach. They are being very careful not to reveal their locations. They are hiding in bunkers and cannot rely on technology to pass drafts or messages. It could be a week before an answer comes back, and then Washington will have to determine whether the response came from someone with actual authority.

RFE/RL: Iran is effectively arguing that what happens in Lebanon affects whether it can negotiate with Washington. Is Tehran creating new leverage for itself? Can US negotiators still compartmentalize these crises, or has that become impossible?

Fontenrose: You are really hitting on an excellent point, because that is exactly what Tehran is trying to do. If you are Tehran, it is understandable. First, it drives a wedge between the United States and Israel, which is one of your goals. Second, it throws a lifeline to Hezbollah, which is the prized fighter in the stable of groups Tehran sponsors. Right now, without Iran being able to resupply Hezbollah, the group is at a very weak point.

Israel is making the argument that this is the moment to finish its military operations and extinguish Hezbollah's ability to pose a terrorist threat. Tehran does not want that to happen because its largest investment would be crushed. Hezbollah is not only Iran's sharpest point against Israel; it is also its training squadron. It is the group Tehran sends around the world -- whether elsewhere in the region or in Latin America --- to train other operators and carry out activities that allow Tehran to keep its own hands clean.

If Iran loses Hezbollah, it loses a major mechanism for spreading influence and destabilizing activities globally. So Tehran very much wants to link these issues because it knows President Trump wants a deal directly with Iran. Tehran does not think it can persuade him to halt Israel's operations in Lebanon unless the two tracks are tied together. That is very much what Iran is trying to do. Israel is very much trying to prevent it. In Washington, it is a very intense debate.

RFE/RL: Ahead of a new round of diplomacy, reports suggest Hezbollah may be willing to halt attacks reciprocally. Could that create new diplomatic space, or is the trust deficit already too deep?

Fontenrose: The trust deficit is extremely deep. But anything that creates diplomatic space is welcome. The challenge is that talks between Israel and Lebanon are not talks with Hezbollah. The cease-fire between the governments of Israel and Lebanon does not include Hezbollah.

Frankly, Hezbollah does not have a seat in these government-to-government discussions. So Hezbollah almost has to offer something, or it risks being left out entirely. Otherwise, the international community will pressure the Lebanese government to rein in Hezbollah.

The group has to make itself relevant by saying, "We will offer something," or, "We will spoil something," because otherwise it has no voice at the table. It is not a government.

RFE/RL: Is Israel becoming the decisive variable in whether these talks ultimately succeed or fail? Does it effectively have a veto over the process?

Fontenrose: Israel has its own say simply because it is not part of the United States. Whatever Washington agrees to, Israel does not automatically have to agree to. Most analysts believe Israel would avoid openly defying the United States because it would not want to damage that relationship.

At the same time, the Israeli government has said repeatedly that Israel cannot be put in a position where it is expected to absorb attacks without the ability to respond. That would make it a sitting duck. I do believe there is a point at which Israel could say: "All right, President Trump, you asked us not to go into Beirut, and we won't. You want a cease-fire while talks continue, and we will honor that."

But if Israel continues taking attacks from Hezbollah or others -- even while the United States is pursuing a cease-fire -- I do believe Israel would act.

RFE/RL: We have seen missile interceptions, attacks on shipping, and accusations of cease-fire violations. How fragile is the cease-fire right now?

Fontenrose: I know it sounds counterintuitive, but I actually think the fact that all sides continue to describe these incidents as cease-fire violations -- rather than declaring the cease-fire dead -- is a good sign. It suggests all sides want to keep escalation contained. They are not seeking a wider conflict.

By traditional definitions, some of these actions are not compatible with a cease-fire. But as long as none of the parties responds in a truly escalatory manner, and everyone continues pretending the cease-fire remains in place, that in itself is a positive indicator about the direction they want to go.

RFE/RL: Big picture: when negotiations appear close to a breakthrough, tensions often spike. Are we seeing both sides maximize leverage before a deal, or is this something more dangerous?

Fontenrose: I think it is exactly what you described. We have seen it in these negotiations and in many others. Every good negotiator tries to maximize leverage, and in this case all sides are strong negotiators. Each party enjoys the negotiation process.

There is a truth in international relations that the side most willing to make a deal often has the most leverage because it believes the agreement will be favorable. The challenge is persuading the other side.

The Iranian side is trying to exploit US weaknesses, including domestic political pressure and concerns about issues such as oil prices. They are running psychological operations aimed at amplifying those concerns among the American public.

The US, meanwhile, understands that Iran's weakness is its economic situation. That is why you see a naval blockade that could remain in place for months without direct military action. It is designed to prevent Iran from earning revenue from oil exports because Washington understands how badly Tehran needs that money.

Both sides are trying to maximize leverage by targeting the vulnerabilities of the other. Right now, it is a race to see who can squeeze the other side to the point of desperation.

RFE/RL: Iran has threatened to activate other fronts, including around key maritime chokepoints such as the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. How concerned should policymakers be that this crisis could spread beyond Lebanon?

Fontenrose: Honestly, I am surprised it has not already. Anyone who is only becoming concerned now has not been paying attention. The fact that the Houthis have not become more heavily involved suggests to me that they are not convinced Iran will emerge as the victor. At the same time, they have been quietly rebuilding stockpiles, producing drones, staying under the radar, and maintaining a relatively cold front with Saudi Arabia. They may be preparing for future contingencies.

Whether they follow Tehran's direction is another question. They could decide involvement does not serve their domestic political objectives and would only invite pressure from Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Western countries.

Iran could also activate militias in Iraq or potentially sleeper cells elsewhere, including in Latin America. Iran's global asymmetric threat remains powerful because it is impossible to prove sleeper cells do not exist.

If you are Iran and much of your conventional military capability has been degraded, playing the asymmetric-threat card is powerful because it forces the world to remain vigilant everywhere, all the time -- even if, in reality, there is very little behind the threat.

RFE/RL: Gulf states have a strong interest in preventing a wider regional war. What role are they playing behind the scenes, and could they ultimately help rescue diplomacy?

Fontenrose: They could. What is interesting is that they are almost using tools from both the Iranian and American playbooks. That means they understand both sides better than Washington and Tehran understand each other.

Some Gulf states are condemning Iranian actions and, in certain cases, participating in strikes against Iranian offensive capabilities. At the same time, they are encouraging discussions about a deal that would address the short-range missiles that threaten them.

And, as you know very well, the Gulf states are not monolithic. Each country has different interests. The UAE has borne the brunt of Iranian pressure because it has alternative export routes. Iran may believe it must hit the UAE harder to inflict real economic damage. Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait are more dependent on access through the strait, so Iran can hurt them simply by closing it.

Iran also wants to avoid provoking a large-scale Saudi military response because Saudi Arabia possesses significant military capabilities and represents a major regional power. Oman occupies a different position. Tehran has tried to pull Muscat closer by arguing that cooperation would benefit Oman economically. At the same time, Oman does not want to alienate either Iran or the United States.

Each Gulf state is therefore pursuing its own strategy—whether through mediation, military participation, economic resilience, or diplomatic pressure.

RFE/RL: What would convince you that diplomacy is gaining momentum rather than sliding toward a wider regional conflict?

Fontenrose: I will be watching whether Iran agrees to language in a memorandum of understanding stating not only that it will dispose of highly enriched uranium, but also that it will not seek to acquire a nuclear weapon elsewhere. That would tell us whether Tehran's claims that its nuclear ambitions are purely civilian are even slightly truthful.

I will also be watching whether the naval blockade becomes part of a step-for-step arrangement. For example, Iran reduces stockpiles by a certain amount, and the blockade is eased proportionally. The details matter. If Iran offers concessions on nuclear, missile, or drone issues, you could see parts of the blockade lifted. In that case, the regime would have a sliver of a chance of survival.

Ultimately, it is all about timing and sequencing. The same three things could happen—sanctions relief, lifting the blockade, and nuclear negotiations—but the order matters more than the events themselves.

If sanctions are lifted and the blockade is removed before nuclear issues are resolved, then Iran effectively wins because it regains its economy and has little incentive to negotiate.

If nuclear issues are addressed first, followed by easing the blockade and then sanctions relief, then you have a deal where the United States achieves its goal of preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon and Iran regains part of its economy. It is all about the order.

When an armed quadcopter buzzed over Lebanon’s southern border into Israel on May 19, one Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier raced up a nearby hill and attempted to snag the drone’s fiber-optic control cable with a piece of scrap metal.

The remarkable scene captured by photojournalists at the militarized border provided the clearest example yet seen of the fiber-optic drones -- first pioneered by Russian soldiers and now ubiquitous in Ukraine -- being used by Iranian-backed Hezbollah militants.

It also highlights the vulnerability of even the world’s most advanced militaries to the cheap drone innovation.

In the past month, Hezbollah militants have killed three IDF soldiers and one Israeli civilian using kamikaze drones controlled through kilometers-long fiber-optic cables.

In response, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the formation of a team to counter the tethered drone threat. Israel is furnishing the task force with an “unlimited budget,” amid growing controversy in the country over the lack of preparedness for a weapon that first emerged in 2024.

The IDF reportedly declined earlier offers from Kyiv to train Israeli forces in anti-drone techniques, but on May 17, Netanyahu claimed he warned of the threat of weaponized quadcopters years before the current crisis over the devices.

“After I saw the war in Ukraine, I thought this could also serve as a tool on our battlefield,” Netanyahu said at a government meeting.

Unlike radio-controlled drones, which are vulnerable to electronic jamming and require a clear line of sight to a transmitter, fiber-optic drones can be navigated to virtually anywhere there is space to fly.

In Ukraine, veteran drone pilots have been documented flying their devices through windows and searching for soldiers in buildings several kilometers inside enemy territory.

That freedom of flight, limited only by battery life and the length of the drone’s cable, raises the specter of militants emerging from tunnels to launch a drone before operating it unseen from beneath the ground.

Tethered quadcopters leave no traceable radio or heat signature, and are small enough to evade many radar systems, provided they fly low against a cluttered background.

Some experts believe the emergence of fiber-optic drones piloted by Hezbollah militants indicates Russia is feeding Iran intelligence about this technology, others believe an arguably more worrying potential is more likely.

Nicole Grajewski, an expert on Russian-Iranian relations, told RFE/RL that the fiber-optic drone photographed on May 19 (below) appears identical to configurations used by Russian forces in Ukraine.

She points to large stockpiles of Russian weaponry held by Hezbollah as a potential indicator that the tethered drone technology is “either coming directly from the Russians or through the Iranians via Russia.”

Moscow has denied supplying weapons to Hezbollah.

But with the Russian invasion of Ukraine being the most visually documented war in history, other analysts believe Hezbollah militants have been able to piece together their own hardware and tactics based on videos from the Russian invasion.

“It doesn't take much intelligence," Yaakov Lappin, a research fellow with the Alma Research and Education Center told RFE/RL. "Hezbollah observed FPV drones in use with significant effect on Ukraine's battlefields and decided to adopt it.” The Israeli military analyst adds that all components for the drones, aside from the explosive warheads, “are freely available off the shelf on online websites.”

Some Chinese portals openly market fiber-optic drone components, including spool containers holding up to 30 kilometers of cable.

Monika Ahlborn, an analyst behind the popular Drone Wars social media account also believes the emergent Hezbollah quadcopters could be a simple case of imitation. She points out that visibility through social media “means concepts, configurations, and tactics can diffuse relatively quickly across different theaters.”

Similar dispersion of battlefield innovations has been seen in recent years, including the use of drone-dropped bomblets. The tactic was first seen in propaganda videos by the extremist Islamic State group in early 2017 and later adopted by fighters in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Lappin says, "None of the existing [Israeli] defenses are designed for the threat of tethered FPV drones."

Early efforts being floated in the country to counter the new threat, he says, include “interceptor drones, electro-optic and acoustic sensors, computerized gunsights, and potentially lasers and/or machine guns directed by sensors.”

Both Russia and Ukraine have developed kinetic anti-drone devices that include lightweight hand-launched interceptors and net guns that have had some documented success on the battlefield.

Every morning, Faisal stands along a road on the outskirts of the Iranian capital, Tehran, waiting for a day job.

The 27-year-old migrant from neighboring Afghanistan used to find manual work on most days, earning up to 10 million rials ($7.50), most of which he sent to his wife and five children back home.

But the informal manual work Faisal relied on to eke out a living has dried up since the United States and Israel launched a bombing campaign of Iran on February 28. The 11-week war has devastated Iran's already-battered economy, left much of the country's infrastructure and industries in tatters, and seen prices for basic food items skyrocket.

The economic fallout from the conflict has hit the estimated 4 million Afghan refugees and migrants in Iran -- many of whom fled war, poverty, and persecution in Afghanistan -- especially hard. Many Afghans have no legal status and are deprived of basic rights in the Islamic republic.

"On most days, I don't find any work. When I do, the pay is half of what I used to get for the same work," Faisal, who spoke on condition that his full name not be used for security reasons, told RFE/RL.

The war has also created a securitized atmosphere in Iran, deepening Afghans' fears of arrest or deportation. Iranian authorities have responded to the conflict by deploying security forces in major cities, cutting off the Internet to many Iranians, and arresting critics.

'Everything Became More Expensive'

Many Afghans in Iran work as day laborers, street vendors, and construction workers.

Among them is Hafizullah Nayebi, who moved to Iran in 2024 with his wife and four children. Living in Iran's central city of Isfahan, Nayebi said the prices of basic food items have soared since the war began.

"The price of flatbread went from 30,000 rials ($0.02) to 200,000 ($0.15)," Nayebi, a welder from Afghanistan's northern Faryab Province, told RFE/RL.

"The price of chicken increased by more than four times," he added. "My salary stayed the same, but everything else, like rice and cooking oil, has become more expensive."

The conflict has exacerbated the economic crisis in Iran, which was already grappling with rising inflation and unemployment. In March, the cost of food surged by 110 percent compared to the same month in 2025.

'People Are Scared'

Afghans who spoke to RFE/RL said the authorities were no longer extending visas for migrants, leaving some in limbo.

More than 1 million Afghans have been deported in recent years as part of Tehran's plan to expel all undocumented migrants. Afghans suffer widespread abuse and discrimination in Iran, where they have often been blamed for insecurity and unemployment.

Faisal said he fears the war could trigger a new crackdown on Afghans. A former member of Afghanistan's security forces under the Western-backed government, he fled when the Taliban seized power in 2021. He has since lived in Iran without a residency permit.

"I live here, trying to hide from the authorities. I live in constant fear of being caught," he said.

In January, Faisal said he tried to leave Iran for Turkey but was turned back at the border. Returning to Afghanistan is not an option. He fears retribution by the Taliban, which has been accused of arresting, torturing, and killing former members of the security forces.

Despite the risks to Afghans, Iran has continued to deport them in large numbers. Over 120,000 Afghans were deported from Iran in the first three months of 2026, according to official Iranian government data.

"People are scared," said Basija Saeedi, an Afghan rights activist based in Iran. "They don't know if they will be able to stay another day."

WASHINGTON -- After US President Donald Trump said he is postponing potential strikes on Iran, questions are mounting over whether Washington and Tehran are edging closer to a deal or simply buying time before a wider regional confrontation.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Mark Cancian, senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the Trump administration is focused on finding an "exit" from the crisis -- even as major disagreements remain over sanctions, nuclear restrictions, and Iran's claims over the Strait of Hormuz.

Cancian argued that while many of Iran's reported demands are nonstarters, there are signs both sides may be narrowing differences on a possible nuclear arrangement and maritime de-escalation.

RFE/RL: Trump says he's holding off on Iran attacks at the request of Gulf states. What does that tell you about where diplomacy stands?

Mark Cancian: Apparently the Iranians have sent another proposal to the United States. It's not clear what's in that one, but that is one element of Trump's decision: He has always wanted to get a negotiated end to the war. He believes he has the upper hand and negotiations will produce an acceptable compromise. Several times he has called off prospective military operations in favor of negotiations. We'll see if anything comes of this new Iranian proposal.

RFE/RL: Reports suggest Tehran is demanding war reparations, sanctions relief, and recognition of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. From a US negotiating standpoint, are those opening positions or outright nonstarters?

Cancian: There are certainly some nonstarters. But there is a deal that could be made. They've closed the gap on nuclear capabilities, including the possibility of Iran sending at least some of its material to a third party and guaranteeing it won't enrich uranium for a period of time. Trump wanted, I think, 20 years. They don't want to go that long -- maybe 10 years, something like that.

Both sides would need to lift their blockade of the strait. Maybe Iran continues to claim sovereignty as long as it doesn't try to exercise it and the United States relieves some sanctions, maybe on oil. I don't think there would be any chance of reparations, but that might be a deal both sides could live with. It's edged toward that, at least on the nuclear side.

RFE/RL: If Tehran is tying negotiations to control over the Strait of Hormuz, does the crisis shift from a nuclear confrontation into a global energy security crisis?

Cancian: Energy security is certainly a key element, but it's a broader question than that. There are many straits around the world where countries might choose to claim sovereignty. Think of the Strait of Malacca and Indonesia, for example. There are many others.

If Iran can claim sovereignty over this strait, then other countries will likely do the same, and we'll have a very chaotic international situation -- very disruptive to shipborne commerce, but also creating the potential for conflict, since many countries would not recognize those claims.

RFE/RL: How seriously should the world take the possibility that Iran could militarize the strait further by imposing tolls or restricting access?

Cancian: They're already doing that. They restrict access, and the only vessels they allow through are those of friendly countries or countries that have paid a toll or transit fee or something similar.

Now, the US doesn't accept that. Most countries don't accept that. But that's where we are right now, and that's what the United States has to prevent in any final agreement.

RFE/RL: Trump appears to be balancing deterrence with delay. Is postponing an attack a sign of strategic patience or evidence the administration is searching for an exit ramp?

Cancian: There's no question the administration is looking for an exit. They very much want to end the conflict. They're facing elections in the fall. The economy is doing fine, but gas prices are up, and that's causing stress for US citizens.

So they've made several diplomatic approaches to try to make a deal, but so far that has not succeeded.

RFE/RL: China signaled this week its opposition to any Iranian effort to weaponize the strait. Did Chinese President Xi Jinping just distance Beijing from Tehran?

Cancian: I don't think so. He did say the strait should remain open. China uses the strait extensively, and they buy a lot of oil from the region, so they have an interest in keeping it open.

But he didn't agree to pressure Iran. He didn't denounce the Iranian regime. And our understanding is that China is still providing some covert support to Iran. So I don't think Beijing is distancing itself in any major way.

RFE/RL: Six months from now, what's the more likely headline: a new Middle East deterrence deal or a regional conflict spilling beyond the Strait of Hormuz? Are we still trying to prevent a wider war, or simply manage escalation one step at a time?

Cancian: Things that cannot go on forever don't. In this case, a blockade of oil leaving the Gulf and a blockade of materials going into Iran, cannot continue indefinitely. Both sides will increasingly feel the economic pressure, so there will be more and more pressure to make a deal.

By six months, that will have to happen. I thought it would have happened by now. At some point there will be a deal both sides can live with. The question is simply how long it takes and what that deal ultimately looks like.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to arrive in Beijing for a two-day state visit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping as both navigate strained relations with the West and an ongoing war in Iran that has choked global energy supplies.

Putin's May 19-20 visit, his 25th to China since he first came to power more than two decades ago, comes less than a week after Xi hosted US President Donald Trump in the Chinese capital.

The trip coincides with the 25th anniversary of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship signed in 2001, and Moscow said Putin and Xi plan to discuss economic cooperation between the two countries, with Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov adding that they also plan to sign a declaration on building a "multipolar world" and "a new type of international relations.”

“I sincerely appreciate President Xi Jinping's commitment to long-term cooperation with Russia. I believe that our good, friendly contacts help us chart our boldest plans for the future and bring them to fruition,” Putin said in a video address released on May 19 ahead of his trip.

Putin and Xi are set to meet on the morning of May 20, but Ushakov did not reveal details beyond saying that “key international and regional issues” will be discussed. Those are expected to include the war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as future energy deals between Beijing and Moscow and Xi’s recent summit with Trump, which the Kremlin said Putin would be briefed on.

The war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year, is also set to feature in the discussions, and Putin’s visit comes after months of sustained Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia that have hit oil infrastructure and civilian centers like Moscow.

“It's about imagery and optics, and I think on the Chinese side, there is a balancing effort, hosting President Trump one week and President Putin the next,” Michael Kimmage, director of the Kennan Institute, a Washington-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “That's a gesture of politeness toward Putin, as if he's on par with the United States and with China.”

Energy Security Moves To The Forefront

China has become Russia’s top trading partner, and Beijing is now the top customer for Russian oil and gas supplies, which Moscow expects the war in Iran to further boost.

The war in the Middle East has added new urgency to Moscow's case. Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies, squeezing China's energy imports and reinforcing arguments for securing overland pipeline alternatives.

Beijing has bought more than $367 billion worth of Russian fossil fuels since the start of the war in Iran, according to data collected by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air.

The crisis has also renewed attention on the proposed Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline. During Putin’s last visit to China in September 2025, Russia and China signed a memorandum to move forward with the 2,600-kilometer project that would bring gas from Russia's northern Yamal Peninsula to China via eastern Mongolia.

But the two sides have yet to agree on pricing and other crucial details, with analysts cautioning that the negotiations could drag on for years and potentially never come to fruition.

“In terms of immediate impact, there is not much upside to be expected in terms of pipeline gas to China. Power of Siberia-1 is pretty much full; it was at capacity last year,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, told RFE/RL. “The next increase in terms of capacity will be with the 12 bcm Far East pipeline, but this one will only start in 2027 and progressively ramp up volumes.”

Beijing has been buying more Russian crude at a discount since Western sanctions were imposed following Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has led to further oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) purchases.

But it’s unclear if the new global energy crunch will lead to any true progress on the Power of Siberia-2.

Beijing has maintained a diversification strategy when it comes to its energy supplies and has also held discussions on supply deals with Turkmenistan.

Russia also agreed in 2025 to supply an additional 2.5 million metric tons of oil annually to China via Kazakhstan.

“In a way, Russia is the answer, but Russia is a very slow answer for China, and quite possibly too slow, especially if the war does get resolved in the next couple of months,” said Kimmage.

Russia’s Growing Reliance On China

The war in Ukraine will also loom over the talks in Beijing.

Trump's summit with Xi last week produced only a brief reference to "the Ukraine crisis" in China's official readout, and no mention of Ukraine at all in US summaries of the meeting.

China's role in sustaining Russia's war effort has drawn sharp criticism from Western governments. In addition to being a steady and growing energy customer, Beijing has also been a major source of dual-use goods critical to Russia's military-industrial capacity.

China has consistently denied supplying lethal weapons to either side in Ukraine and says it strictly controls dual-use exports.

But analysts note that the two countries’ relationship has grown increasingly asymmetric, with Russia now deeply dependent on China for trade and investment.

“The war in Ukraine has made Russia much more dependent on China,” Timothy Ash, an associate fellow at Chatham House, a London-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “I think Putin will be very eager that there's no warming in the US-China relationship to the detriment of Russia.”

WASHINGTON -- The Trump-Xi summit offered fresh clues about how Beijing is positioning itself on Iran amid growing tensions over sanctions, regional security, and the future of energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.

While US President Donald Trump said both sides agreed Iran should never obtain a nuclear weapon and supported reopening the Strait of Hormuz, analysts noted that China avoided making concrete public commitments on sanctions enforcement, reducing Iranian oil purchases, or pressuring Tehran directly.

Instead, experts say, Beijing appears focused on protecting its strategic and economic interests while avoiding deeper entanglement in the conflict.

Support For Stability, Without Pressure

Publicly, China has committed itself to the broad principles of de-descalation, freedom of navigation, and opposition to Iranian nuclear weapons.

But analysts noted Beijing stopped short of endorsing tougher measures against Tehran.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, said the gap between China's rhetoric and actions remains significant.

"While readouts from the summit suggested China wants the Strait of Hormuz to be open and for there to be no tolling, China's ambassador is criticizing the US-Bahraini draft UN Security Council resolution demanding Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz," Brodsky told RFE/RL on May 15.

"China also says it does not want the conflict to continue but is supplying Iran with dual-use components for its missile and drone program," he added.

That dual-track approach -- supporting regional stability while maintaining ties with Tehran -- was a recurring theme in expert assessments following the summit.

At Washington's Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), analysts noted that Beijing emphasized keeping the strait open and ensuring oil continued flowing through the Persian Gulf but avoided publicly committing to sanctions enforcement or cuts in Iranian oil imports.

Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg senior fellow for China studies at CFR, told RFE/RL China's language remained "vague but useful with regard to de-escalation," adding Beijing wanted to show support for stability without assuming responsibility for enforcing it.

"China wanted to show that the message is clear: Keep the oil flowing, keep the strait open," Liu said. "But they haven't really made any commitment to police stability or provide stability."

Oil Flows And Strategic Interests

Much of China's posture appears tied to energy security.

China remains Iran's main oil customer and depends heavily on Gulf shipping routes. Analysts say Beijing's overriding objective is likely to preserve stable access to energy supplies while avoiding a direct confrontation with Washington.

That calculation was also reflected in comments from Brian Mast, a Republican from Florida and chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee.

"They have a substantial relationship with Iran, have bought a significant amount of oil from Iran, and would love to continue to do so, or not have other Gulf oil bottled up from them," Mast told an audience at CFR.

At the same time, in response to an RFE/RL question, Mast argued that China has avoided fully backing Iran militarily.

"They are not coming to Iran's defense," he said. "Did China participate in targeting assistance for the Iranians? Absolutely, yes. Would I say that they dove into this? No, they didn't."

Mast said Beijing appears to be balancing competing strategic interests: whether prolonged instability benefits China by drawing US attention and resources deeper into the region, or whether restoring secure navigation and oil flows better serves Chinese economic priorities.

"They're absolutely trying to balance which one of those is better for them," he said.

The summit also fueled speculation about possible behind-the-scenes discussions involving sanctions relief.

Trump suggested sanctions on Chinese "teapot" refineries processing Iranian crude may have been discussed during talks with Xi. Analysts in Washington say such comments could indicate the US is exploring ways to encourage Chinese cooperation through incentives rather than relying solely on pressure.

Rush Doshi, former deputy senior director for China and Taiwan at the National Security Council during the Biden administration, said Trump's comments raised the possibility of a broader arrangement involving Chinese purchases of US crude oil and flexibility on sanctions enforcement for some refiners handling Iranian crude.

No agreement was publicly announced, however, and Beijing has not confirmed such discussions.

Questions Remain

Another issue hanging over the summit involved reports that Chinese companies may have considered providing weapons or additional support to Iran.

Chris McGuire, a senior fellow for China and emerging technologies at CFR, noted that concerns already exist regarding Chinese transfers of dual-use technologies supporting Iran's military capabilities.

Trump said Xi committed not to sell weapons to Iran, though analysts cautioned such assurances would likely be closely scrutinized over time.

Meanwhile, China has continued pushing back against US sanctions targeting firms linked to the Iranian oil trade.

Liu noted that before the summit, China's Commerce Ministry issued an injunction opposing US sanctions on several Chinese refineries accused of purchasing Iranian crude.

The move highlighted Beijing's broader resistance to what it views as extraterritorial sanctions enforcement and suggested China is unlikely to publicly align itself with Washington's pressure campaign against Tehran.

WASHINGTON -- As Washington weighs its next steps with Tehran, some analysts see familiar patterns emerging -- not from the Middle East, but from the Kremlin's playbook.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute focusing on national security and transatlantic relations, said Iran appears to be borrowing directly from Russia's negotiation strategy: Prolong talks, seek concessions incrementally, and avoid making meaningful commitments while maintaining the appearance of diplomacy.

RFE/RL: When you look at Iran's response to recent peace proposals, do you see parallels with Russia's approach to negotiations over Ukraine -- publicly embracing diplomacy while privately hardening its demands?

Luke Coffey: There are a lot of similarities, because Iran has watched the [US special envoy Steve] Witkoff playbook over the past year or so with Russia. The Iranians know what they can get away with. They know how to drag the discussions out, make it look like Trump is achieving something, when in reality, he'll achieve nothing. And they have learned this from the Russians.

RFE/RL: Both Moscow and Tehran want sanctions relief before making major concessions. Is that diplomacy or leverage politics dressed up as diplomacy?

Coffey: From their point of view, it makes sense to sequence it this way. They're going to ask for this whether or not the Trump administration will lift sanctions beforehand remains to be seen.

In the case of Russia, you could argue that maybe the lifting of the oil sanctions on Russian crude oil -- while many observers thought it was linked to global markets and Iran -- was in fact a concession given to Russia by the Trump administration.

If I was Iran or Russia, I would want international sanctions lifted. I would want frozen assets released. But it would be a mistake to do so at this point because Russia is the aggressor here. In the case of Iran, Iran has a 47-year track record of conducting terrorism across the region, especially targeting US interests. It should be up to them to make the first move, not the United States.

RFE/RL: Russia wants frozen assets returned, while Iran wants access to frozen funds and economic normalization. How dangerous is it when negotiations become less about peace and more about financial recovery for authoritarian regimes?

Coffey: It's a slippery slope, and this is one of the reasons why nothing should be agreed until everything is agreed when it comes to these peace talks, whether it's with Russia or with Iran. Both will try to take whatever they can get while giving back the least amount required.

RFE/RL: Iran wants negotiations tied to Israel's actions in Lebanon. Russia talks about addressing the "root causes" of its war in Ukraine. Is this the same tactic, expanding the conflict to avoid accountability?

Coffey: The situation is a bit different, because there are different motivating factors.

For Russia, this is about rebuilding an empire, and for Iran, it's about spreading a revolution. If we were dealing with the Soviet Union, maybe there would be more similarity. But because we're dealing with imperial Russia, the Russia we're dealing with today is like it was during the time of the czar. We have a 21st-century Russia with 19th-century ambitions.

A similarity is this sense of almost ethnic superiority. Ethnic Russians think they are superior to the other constituent ethnic groups, whether inside the Russian Federation or those that used to be part of the Soviet empire, almost to a level of snobbery.

The same is the case with Iran and the Arabs, in particular the Gulf states, where the Persians see themselves as this established power -- kind of like old money -- and the Gulf states are these nouveau riche Arabs who don't know how to behave or handle their newfound resources.

RFE/RL: You've spent years studying NATO and Russian strategy. Do you think Tehran concluded from the Ukraine war that persistence eventually exhausts the West politically?

Coffey: I think they do watch what's happening in Ukraine. But I think they draw even more lessons from America's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and from the unwillingness -- or lack of political appetite -- to deploy US military forces on the ground in Iran.

They know that it's very unlikely President Trump would agree to this, so they know they can probably ride out this war. They can absorb and withstand the bombardment, the bombings, and the air strikes and come out the other end surviving.

And for Iran, all they need to do is survive. They don't necessarily need to win. If the US is unwilling to put boots on the ground, then achieving some of the objectives outlined by Trump seems really difficult, if not impossible.

RFE/RL: Trump recently called Iran's latest response "totally unacceptable." How much of this is Iran testing Washington -- or testing Trump personally -- because it believes the White House still wants a deal badly enough to stay at the table?

Coffey: Trump wants a deal, and Iran knows this. These Iranians are not stupid. These are very sophisticated, savvy people. They may be extremists, they may be Islamists, but they are not dumb, and they understand the political dynamics at play in America.

They understand midterm elections are coming up. They understand the summer holidays are coming up and that gasoline prices impact Americans.

They saw the latest inflation figures that were released -- 3.8 percent, the highest rate of inflation in more than three years. So they are quite happy to remain in the status quo.

Yes, it's difficult for them. Yes, they're not generating much revenue. Yes, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed for them, although you do hear stories of ships passing through the US blockade. But they're willing to withstand this because, in their society, the way the state structures oppress and suppress the people means they can endure a terrible economic situation. They can withstand inflation in a way that elected leaders in the US cannot, because American politicians will be punished at the ballot box.

Trump talks about regime change. There are new people in Iran -- and he says similar things about Maduro in Venezuela -- but this isn't really regime change. It is a leadership change while the regime itself remains fully intact. Maduro's internal security apparatus, intelligence services, and armed forces remain intact, as if he were still there. The same is true with Iran. The tools used for internal oppression -- the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps], for example -- remain fully intact.

Yes, they have fewer missiles. They have fewer drones. They have fewer airplanes. They effectively have no navy. But the internal security structures remain. Until these are degraded, the people of Iran will not feel safe or comfortable taking to the streets. And this is the dilemma Trump will face going forward.

RFE/RL: At what point does diplomacy become performative? Critics argue that both Iran and Russia use negotiations as strategic delay mechanisms while continuing military pressure.

Coffey: You always run the risk that it becomes performative. Symbolism matters in international affairs, so perhaps negotiations are at least partly inherently performative, as both sides posture to try to get into a stronger negotiating position.

That's why you need wise and experienced statesmen and stateswomen to determine when a deal can be made. When a deal cannot be made, you have to walk away from the table and start pursuing other policy options. But you have to know when you're at that point, and you have to be realistic about it. And I'm not so sure this is exactly the case right now with the administration.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.