Middle East
Hamas Leader's Death Makes Israeli 'Hit List' Shorter But Might Not Alter Gaza War
The death of Yahya Sinwar just months after he was named the top leader of Hamas highlights the difficulties the U.S.- and EU-designated Palestinian terrorist group has in protecting high-value targets from Israel, but it might not have a major effect on the course of the war in the Gaza Strip.
The 62-year-old Sinwar was accused of organizing and directing Hamas's deadly assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, landing him at the top of Israel's hit list.
Israel confirmed on October 17 that Sinwar was killed in a military operation in the southern city of Rafah in Gaza. Hamas has not yet commented.
Sinwar's death highlights the high turnover rate of senior Hamas members as well as Israel's "very deep coverage in terms of intelligence and the ability to strike quickly when high-value targets are detected," said Lucas Webber, senior threat intelligence analyst at Tech Against Terrorism and research fellow at the Soufan Center.
The timing of Sinwar's death is also significant, he said, coming as Israel is renewing its offensive in northern Gaza and expanding operations against Hamas ally Hezbollah, an armed group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon.
"It's seen as a tactical success, taking out a high-value target at a time when they kind of need this internal support for the expansion of their internal and external military campaign," Webber said.
Webber was doubtful about the impact that Sinwar's death could have toward ending the war in Gaza, however.
"He [Sinwar] was obviously very experienced and had a high status among Hamas and its supporters, but I don't think his killing will change the trajectory of the conflict in any fundamental way," Webber said.
Sinwar became Hamas's top leader soon after Israel's suspected assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the group's political chief, in Tehran on July 31.
Hamas is still fighting nearly a year after Israel's retaliatory invasion of Gaza and will be difficult to defeat, Webber notes. Sinwar's death might require some "reorientation" by Hamas, he said, but will not "factor too much" into Israel's attempts to win the war.
Thanassis Cambanis, director of the U.S.-based Century Foundation think tank, says it's difficult to gauge the impact Sinwar's death will have on Hamas's viability to remain in power in Gaza.
But he does see two possible outcomes to Sinwar's death.
"One is that Israel becomes emboldened to even more intensely pursue the complete destruction of Hamas and Gaza," he said. "The other option, which would be more positive, is that his death would create an opening for negotiations to actually lead to an end to the conflict."
Neither Hamas nor Israel has to this point been seriously interested in ending the war, Cambanis says.
"Both sides see it in their interest to continue fighting,” he added. “Sinwar's death could change the dynamic for the better by creating an opening for Hamas to either surrender or come to some kind of negotiated settlement that until now, its leadership hasn't really been that interested in pursuing."
As for who would be in line to replace Sinwar, who was seen as a "ruthless" replacement for his predecessor Haniyeh, Cambanis said that can go two ways as well.
"We've seen more pragmatic people follow after periods of really intense extremism, and then we've also seen factions or parties where people really double down and with each leader who gets killed the successor is even more hard-line," he said.
Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Washington-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, warned that the "idea behind Hamas -- that Palestinian statehood only can come through armed resistance against Israel -- has not only not been killed, but it has also likely flourished."
"Israel's indiscriminate bombing of Gaza and massive killings of civilians, including forced starvation, has likely radicalized the Palestinian people and provided more ground for recruitment for Hamas," he added.
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Kazakh, Uzbek Leaders Seek Trump Approval With Gaza Peace Pledges
The decision by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to join US allies in the Arab world in providing cash and other help -- possibly including troops -- for the reconstruction of Gaza marks another moment in efforts to forge a new, close relationship with US President Donald Trump.
The move follows last November's 5+1 meeting in Washington, in which the Central Asian nations agreed trade, diplomatic, and mineral deals to strengthen ties.
At the inaugural Board of Peace summit on February 19, Kazakhstan promised substantial funding to be administered through the World Bank’s Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund.
It also said it would deploy troops to an International Stabilization Force (ISF), including security personnel and a field hospital staffed by military medical experts. By doing so, Kazakhstan joins a small group of countries such as Indonesia, Kosovo, and Albania, that have publicly promised peacekeepers.
For its part, Uzbekistan emphasized previously announced plans to redevelop a specific slice of territory in Gaza.
Former Kazakh diplomat Dulat Baqyshev told RFE/RL that both nations were investing in the relationship with Washington -- and aiming for a concrete return on their money.
“Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan need US support. It’s been 35 years since our independence. Had any US president visited our region? No," he said.
Since achieving independence in 1991, the countries of Central Asia have sought to balance out diplomatic and economic influence from China and Russia.
"Our independence, our sovereignty becomes stronger when it’s supported by the US," Baqyshev said.
Kazakhstan Brings 'Boots And Brains'
For now, the pledges made in Washington remain just that -- promises that may, or may not, be delivered on later.
But Astana would bring prior experience from United Nations–mandated peacekeeping operations since 2014, including deployments under the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), giving it an established track record in multinational stabilization efforts.
Kazakhstan also pledged wheat supplies to stabilize food security in Gaza and 500 university scholarships for Palestinian students over the next five years, aiming to rebuild Gaza’s professional class.
Still, no specific financial contribution or details on the number of Kazakh soldiers have been published yet, leaving some uncertainty about the scale of commitments.
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev presented plans for an “Uzbekistan Quarter” in Gaza, with housing, schools, kindergartens, health-care facilities, and community centers.
The plans sit alongside other Gaza reconstruction plans pushed by Washington, which present the war-ravaged region as a luxury holiday riviera. Uzbekistan says its plans draw on experience it has gained rebuilding earthquake‑affected areas in Turkey.
No specific financial amount or the financial sources for this project have been made public.
Great Expectations
While the actual sums were not made clear, Trump signaled that he expected significant financial commitments from participating countries.
Both the Uzbek and Kazakh leaders echoed the US president's positive tone.
Mirziyoyev described Trump’s plan as “bold and historic,” while Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev emphasized that “working together on this initiative is a step toward a safer, more stable region.”
Toqaev also called for a peace prize to be created, named for Trump.
“For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, this is about prestige and reputation, and also about closer relations with the United States," Uzbek political analyst Alisher Ilkhamov told RFE/RL.
“Trump expects them to be willing to pay for this opportunity, and they seem prepared to do so,” he added.
Ilkhamov suggested that Kazakhstan might also have an immediate, specific aim: U.S. pressure on Ukraine to stop attacks on the Russian port of Novorossiysk, a key conduit for Kazakh oil exports.
Strikes in recent months have had a major impact on an important source of Kazakh budget revenue.
“It is no coincidence that Toqaev has gone out of his way to flatter Trump for the second time,” he said.
- By Amos Chapple
Azadi Tower: Architect Watches From Exile As Beloved Iranian Landmark Coopted By Regime
When images from the 47th anniversary of Iran's Islamic Revolution were published around the world on February 11, Hossein Amanat's heart sank. The imposing backdrop to the missiles and drones paraded at the Tehran event was the Azadi Tower, which the Iranian-born architect designed more than half a century ago.
"I feel so sorry," Amanat said of his most beloved work being coopted by the same government that once put him on a death list. "They are so unjust that they use anything to give themselves legitimacy."
Amanat was 24 years old when he won a 1966 contest to design a monumental gateway to Tehran. Originally named the Shahyad (Shah's Memorial) Tower, the 45-meter landmark was to be completed in time for the grand celebrations planned by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to mark the 2,500th year of the Persian Empire.
Today the monument is widely regarded as the most iconic example of modern architecture in Iran, serving as visual shorthand for Tehran comparable to the Eiffel Tower in Paris. But Amanat says he had no sense of the structure's significance until he saw the finished project with his own eyes in 1971.
"I was working with a friend of mine in the basement [of the tower]," the 83-year-old recalled. "Somebody came and said: 'The scaffolds are off. Do you want to have a look?'"
Walking beneath the monument, Amanat told RFE/RL by phone, "I had goosebumps all over my body…. Usually I know what I'm designing, but going under that arch and looking up, it really overwhelmed me." The outcome, he said, had exceeded his own vision.
When the shah held a ceremony to open the monument in October 1971, its young architect stood and watched far from the assembled foreign dignitaries, which included the younger brother of Japan's Emperor Hirohito and Imelda Marcos, the first lady of the Philippines.
To Amanat's surprise, he was spotted by the Iranian ruler. "When he approached me he turned to all the kings that were there, especially [the Emperor of Ethiopia] Haile Selassie," Amanat recalled, "and he said, 'This young man has built this building,' and he was full of pride."
After Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, statues to the shah were torn down throughout the country and a massive demolition effort wiped out a mausoleum to his father. The Shahyad Tower seemed an obvious target for similar treatment, yet it survived and was renamed the Azadi (Freedom) Tower.
Amanat believes there are two reasons the tower was not demolished, despite some in the new regime wanting it gone.
"I think because of the attention to this building, they couldn't [act] against the wish of the people," he said. Additionally, Amanat pointed out that the marble and concrete structure would be "difficult to tear down -- you would have to use a lot of munitions."
Amanat himself was outside Iran when the 1979 revolution swept the country, and he settled in Canada in 1980. He now heads a successful architecture firm in Vancouver designing buildings around the world. But he has kept an eye on the treatment of his tower.
"They have damaged a lot out of lack of knowledge," he said. That damage has included work crews inexplicably tearing up some of the paving stones at the base of the arch. Waterproofing material beneath the stones was destroyed, leading to rainwater trickling into the museum beneath the tower.
Ironically, the monument bearing the name freedom today bristles with cameras. "If they want to put a cable, mostly [for] security cameras for their own spying on people, they drive screws and bolts into the exposed concrete there, which has been poured with great attention," Amanat said.
The architect said the aesthetic of the Azadi Tower was drawn partially from exploring ancient Persian architecture, including the Vakil Mosque in Shiraz.
Gathering inspiration from his own country's heritage was relatively rare in the 1960s, when young Iranian creatives largely looked to the West for inspiration. The tower, Amanat says, "is somehow kind of giving an idea that it is connected to the very deep past, yes. But it is thinking of going forward because of its shape elevating to heaven."
The Azadi Tower was one of the key gathering points for the 2009 protests that swept Iran following a disputed presidential election in June of that year.
Today, the same regime that prompted Amanat -- a member of the persecuted Baha'i faith -- to live in exile after the 1979 revolution still casts a shadow over his work. He is currently working on a shrine to the son of the founder of the religion in Acre, Israel. When Iran traded missile strikes with Israel in 2025, Amanat said foreign workers on the project, including Italian artisans, had to be evacuated, significantly delaying construction.
When asked what his first day in Iran would look like if he were able to return to the country of his birth, Amanat paused for thought before responding.
"I should pay my tributes or respect to the people who have been killed through all this period that I haven't been in Iran. People who have sacrificed themselves for the freedom of this country," he said.
'Robust' US Military Deployment To Gulf Ahead Of Possible Iran Strikes
A diplomatic deal between the United States and Iran could still avoid a military confrontation.
But one of Washington's largest-ever military buildups in the Persian Gulf is rapidly taking shape.
Experts say the deployment is aimed at giving US President Donald Trump military options if he chooses to act on his threats to attack Tehran for failing to make a nuclear deal and violently cracking down on protesters.
Iranian security forces killed thousands of demonstrators in January, after protests erupted in late December 2025 over the sharp collapse of the Iranian currency.
"The gathering of forces is a point of pressure applied by the United States on Iran to come to a negotiated agreement," said Amin Tarzi, professor of strategic studies at Marine Corps War College.
He said that after the buildup, the US military posture in the Gulf is "robust" with "naval and defensive air defense capabilities, plus offensive air components."
He said that in terms of numbers, the US buildup might not be the largest in the region where Washington has fought some of its most recent foreign wars.
Hundreds of thousands of American troops participated in two major US-led operations against Iraq: the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which toppled Saddam Hussein's regime.
"The nature of war has changed dramatically, even compared to 2003," Tarzi said. "These are assets that have more capability but a much smaller footprint.
'Massive Armada'
In late January, President Trump reiterated his call for Tehran to face a "far worse" attack than the one aimed at the country in June if it fails to make a deal over its nuclear program.
He said a "massive armada" was heading to Iran and it was able to "rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence".
The fleet is led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, supported by several advanced warships that together form a carrier strike group. Last week, one of the strike group's jets shot down an Iranian drone.
David Des Roches, a professor at Washington's Thayer Marshall Institute, said multi-role ships such as USS Delbert D. Black, USS Mitscher, and USS McFaul are already in the Persian Gulf theater. All of these can launch missile strikes and have advanced naval and air defense capabilities.
On February 10, Trump said he might dispatch a second aircraft carrier strike group to the region to take part in the military action if talks with Iran fail.
Des Roches said the US forces currently around Iran are nimbler. "[The buildup] is much smaller, and it's much easier to scale up and scale down," he said.
He said advances in US military capacity mean it is also possible that Washington can again use strategic B2 bombers just like it used in June 2025 to strike deep inside Iran.
"These can come from the United States or Diego Garcia," he said. In the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, the US shares a joint military base with the United Kingdom.
CENTCOM
The Gulf region is part of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations, where the oil-rich Sunni Arab monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar have hosted US army, air force, and naval bases. The region is now estimated to have up to 40,000 US troops.
The Al-Udeid air base in Qatar houses CENTCOM's forward headquarters. In June 2025, Iran attempted to target it in retaliation for the US air strikes on its nuclear facilities. The US Navy's Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain, from where it secures some of the world's busiest shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.
Additional US bases and ships are scattered in Jordan, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. In Iraq and Syria, the US military presence has mostly been aimed at counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State extremist group.
"The massive increase in naval presence, in air presence, in air defenses, does signal the United States is very serious," said Brian Carter, the research manager at the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute think tank in Washington.
He said that Washington is bringing in air defense platforms to help defend its bases and US allies from any Iranian attacks.
"The navy fits into that picture as well, because naval ships can be armed with surface-to-air interceptors to shoot down incoming missiles," he said.
Across the Middle East, Washington has beefed up its air and missile defenses.
In recent weeks, it has deployed additional batteries of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile defense systems to the Gulf Arab nations and Jordan. Patriots are effective against low-flying and short-range projectiles. THAAD is designed to intercept ballistic missiles at high altitudes.
Carter says that, in contrast to Iran's weak defense capabilities, the US defensive capacity is quite strong because of investments during the past decade.
"That's a kind of important asymmetry that we should keep in mind as we're thinking about strikes going forward," he said.
- By Ray Furlong
Iran's President Says Country Is Open To Nuclear Inspectors As Trump-Netanyahu Meet In Washington
Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian has said his country is open to admitting international inspectors to prove its nuclear program is "peaceful," in comments marking the 47th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, as US naval forces stand poised in the region for possible military strikes.
"We are not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. We have stated this repeatedly and are ready for any verification," he said on February 11, at anniversary celebrations taking place against a backdrop of a deadly crackdown in which security forces killed thousands of people attending mass nationwide protests last month.
Videos posted overnight from February 10-11 showed fireworks in Tehran in celebration of the anniversary -- even as many mourned dead loved ones.
On the videos, people could also be heard defiantly crying "death to the dictator" and "death to Khamenei," referring to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The crackdown on protesters was strongly condemned by the United States and its allies and led to the US naval build up, with US President Donald Trump telling protesters that Washington was coming to support them.
"We have an armada that is heading there and another one might be going," Trump said in an interview with Axios on February 10. The current US deployment is one the largest in the years.
After talks between US and Iranian teams in Oman on February 6, Washington imposed additional sanctions on Iran's oil sector. Further talks are expected but no date has been set.
Later on February 11, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is due to meet Trump in Washington to discuss the situation. A statement by Netanyahu's office said he wanted talks with Iran to include its ballistic missile program and support for armed proxies and Tehran-backed militant groups in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
Alexander Gray, who served on the National Security Council during Trump's first term in the White House, told RFE/RL these were the issues that would likely determine whether strikes are launched -- rather than efforts to help Iran's opposition.
"He doesn't want to see these brutal crackdowns. But I think the president's also a realist," he said. "From a fundamental US interest standpoint, as much as we decry the horrific human rights abuses, I think we are most likely to be effective in advocating for changes to their proxy behavior and their missile and nuclear programs."
US Vice President JD Vance appeared to confirm this as he departed from a visit to Azerbaijan on February 11.
"If the Iranian people want to overthrow the regime, that's up to the Iranian people. What we're focused on right now is the fact that Iran can't have a nuclear weapon. That's been the focus of the president's policy, even going back to the first administration," he said.
- By Kian Sharifi and
- RFE/RL's Radio Farda
Why Israel Now Eyes Iran's Missiles Over Nukes Ahead Of Netanyahu-Trump Talks
As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu prepares to meet US President Donald Trump in Florida on December 29, the agenda centers on Iran -- with a twist.
Israel is laser-focused on Iran’s ballistic missile program, which it views as the most urgent existential threat after the US-Israeli strikes severely damaged Iran's nuclear infrastructure during a 12-day aerial campaign in June.
This shift highlights a growing US-Israel divergence. Trump has repeatedly described Iran's nuclear threat as "obliterated," crediting wartime bombings of sites in Isfahan, Fordow, and Natanz. Israel agrees the program is set back by a year or two.
However, it warns that missiles -- which Iran is working to amass -- could soon overwhelm defenses, as demonstrated when 36 out of 550 missiles struck Israeli soil in June, causing widespread damage.
Missiles As 'Immediate' Priority
Israeli officials, speaking to NBC News and Axios, describe Iran's missile ramp-up as "more pressing" than its nuclear program.
Israel says the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has carried out drills and has warned Washington that Tehran might use the exercises as cover for surprise attacks.
This comes amid contradictory reports in Iran over whether missile tests are actually taking place. Iranian media, including the IRGC-affiliated Fars news agency, reported on December 22 that the armed forces were conducting drills, with users on social media sharing videos and footage of contrails in the skies over central and western Iran. However, the state broadcaster swiftly denied the reports, citing an unnamed "informed source" who insisted the contrails were from "high‑altitude aircraft" and claimed that no exercises were underway.
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief Eyal Zamir hinted at readiness for new strikes against Iran "wherever required," prioritizing production lines that Israel fears could churn out 3,000 missiles annually.
Netanyahu plans to present Trump with strike options -- Israeli-led, joint, or US-backed -- arguing missiles enable proxy wars via Hezbollah and Houthis while shielding Iran’s nuclear revival.
Farzin Nadimi, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, told RFE/RL's Radio Farda that Israel is pressing the United States to reclassify missiles as weapons of mass destruction.
“Israel is trying to shift this view, using the recent war's experience to convince the United States that Iran's missile capabilities are as existentially threatening as its nuclear ones,” Nadimi said.
He noted US reluctance, viewing nukes as the core danger, now degraded, but added, “From Israel's standpoint, these should count as weapons of mass destruction for its people.”
Nadimi warned that total missile destruction could force a doctrinal pivot in Tehran.
“If Israel fully destroys Iran's offensive missile capabilities... it would either have to surrender or make a fundamental doctrinal shift,” he said, adding that Iran's technical path to nuclear warheads remains feasible in a secure lab using 90-percent enriched uranium stocks.
Iran’s Missile Red Line
Iran has long maintained that its missile program is non-negotiable, asserting it is purely defensive. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei reiterated this on December 22:
“The defensive capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been designed with the aim of deterring aggressors from any thought of attacking Iran. Under no circumstances are they a matter that can be discussed or negotiated.”
Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, noted that while the United States and Israel may want different things from Iran, they converge on one point: “Iran is weakened now, so it's time to extract more concessions.”
Iran has capped the range of its missiles at 2,000 kilometers, though in recent months it has hinted it could increase the limit if it deems necessary. Azizi said the United States and Israel want Iran to reduce the range of its missiles -- a non-starter for Tehran.
Even in the unlikely scenario of an agreement on Iran’s missile program, he noted that Washington is aware enforcement would be difficult, given the absence of any international monitoring body or safeguards regime for missile programs.
Against this backdrop, Azizi argued that missiles serve as pressure leverage:
“First, to make Iran fully abandon [uranium] enrichment on its soil; second, to secure concessions on arms transfers to groups such as Hezbollah or the Houthis.”
Iranian Media Gleeful Yet Concerned
Israeli rhetoric around Iran’s missile program has been met with a mixture of delight and alarm in Iranian media.
Highlighting Iran’s pace in replenishing its missile arsenal following the June war, the IRGC-affiliated newspaper Javan said Israel was “terrified” of Iran’s ability to launch hundreds of missiles in a potential conflict. The same sentiment was echoed by other hard-line outlets, such as Mehr news agency.
But others have urged caution. Bultan News argued that Netanyahu was exaggerating Iran’s ability to restore its missile stockpile to justify an attack. It added that Tehran must take the rhetoric seriously.
“Every piece of news or report that is published can be part of a larger puzzle. Distinguishing which news is real and which is psychological warfare is not easy. But making that effort is a national security necessity,” it argued.
Hannah Kaviani and Reza Jamali of RFE/RL’s Radio Farda contributed to this report.
- By Iliya Jazaeri and
- Kian Sharifi
One Year After Assad's Fall: Iran's Strategic Collapse In Syria
The collapse of longtime Syrian President Bashar al-Assad last year was felt across the Middle East -- nowhere more than in Iran, his closest ally.
Assad’s fall was a major blow to Iran, which had used Syria to expand its regional influence and funnel weapons to armed groups fighting Israel, Tehran’s archrival.
One year on from Assad’s overthrow on December 8, 2024, Iran is still grappling with the consequences of its strategic defeat in Syria. The Islamic republic has attempted to rebuild its influence in Syria, but experts say there is likely no way back for Iran.
With Assad’s collapse, Iran lost its only “advanced base” in the Mediterranean Sea and saw the billions it spent on propping up Damascus go up in smoke, said Rami Abdulrahman, director of the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
“In other words, Iran, after expanding its reach in the region, has returned to its natural borders,” Abdulrahman told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda.
After Syria’s civil war broke out, Iran spent an estimated $30 billion to $50 billion supporting the Assad government from 2011 to 2020.
Tehran also trained, armed, and deployed tens of thousands of Shi’ite fighters from across the region to defend Assad. Tehran also sent hundreds of its own military personnel to Syria.
Those commitments underlined Syria’s importance to Iran. Under Assad, Syria was a cornerstone of Tehran’s “axis of resistance,” its loose network of proxies and partners in the region.
Syria was the only other state that was a member of the alliance, which also includes Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Tehran’s most important and potent proxy. Syria served as the primary supply route to Hezbollah -- a corridor that closed with Assad's departure.
No Easy Path To Reconciliation
Soon after Assad’s fall, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called on Syrians to “rise up” against the new authorities in comments that were widely seen as an attempt to interfere in Syria.
In March, when sectarian violence flared in western Syria, some accused Tehran of stoking unrest, noting that several Shi’ite militia leaders involved in the clashes had been trained by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
The incident, experts said, underscored Tehran’s attempts to use sectarian violence and alleged atrocities committed by forces loyal to Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to regain its foothold in the country.
Experts say Iran is likely to cultivate local militias and proxy commanders rather than overtly deploying its forces.
“Documented reports about the Islamic republic's actions have not been published, but various media have published reports about Tehran's efforts to rebuild forces loyal to it in Syria,” said Ata Mohamed-Tabriz, a Spain-based Middle East expert.
“We also see that the Islamic republic is trying to cooperate with forces opposed to [Sharaa] or trying to amplify their voices.”
There have also been reports suggesting that Iran is looking to Russia, which has managed to cultivate ties with Sharaa, to help it establish relations with the new government.
But Abdulrahman believes there is no way back for Iran.
“There is no possibility, neither in terms of government nor in terms of popular base, even among Alawites, for accepting Iran's presence again in Syria. Among Alawites too, Iran is one of the countries most criticized,” he said.
Alawites are the sect of Shi'ite Islam to which Assad and many of his supporters belong. Shi’ite-majority Iran has portrayed itself as a protector of the sect.
Still, Syria's interim president has not entirely shut the door on Tehran, even as Iran is among only two states whose citizens are currently barred from entering the country.
Speaking about ties with Iran, Sharaa told Syrian state television in a recent interview that Tehran left “a deep wound” on Syrians, in reference to Tehran’s support for Assad during the civil war.
“But we do not say that the severance of relations between us and Iran will be permanent. If we reach a stage where Syria is respected, there is no interference in its internal affairs, and sectarian tensions are not fueled, relations will be established,” he said.
These dynamics now define the parameters of Syria’s emerging foreign policy. Since moving away from Iran, Damascus has seen many international sanctions lifted, including by the United States and Europe, opening doors to foreign investment in the war-ravaged country.
Syria’s new government is determined to protect these gains, and restoring ties with Tehran would require fundamental shifts in Iranian foreign policy -- changes that appear unlikely under the current leadership in Tehran, experts said.
- By Kian Sharifi
Why Iraq's Election Is Iran's Last, Best Hedge
Iraq's parliamentary election on November 11 arrives as Tehran's regional hand weakens and the outcome could determine whether it preserves a vital anchor in its sphere of influence, financing, and deterrence or slides into a costlier, fragmented game of managing proxies from afar.
With setbacks in Syria and growing constraints on Hezbollah -- designated a terror organization by the United States -- in Lebanon, Iraq has become the indispensable arena for safeguarding Tehran's regional depth, economic access, and deterrence architecture.
"The parliamentary election could indeed be consequential for Iran, because if its preferred candidates fare poorly, it's just another thing that goes wrong for Tehran, and could lead to a cascading effect where Iranian power is viewed as significantly diminished," said Colin Clarke, executive director of the Soufan Center, a New York-based think tank.
If Iran fails to get its desired result, Clarke added, it would damage Tehran's brand across the region "as it makes the leaders look weak."
Iran's Uphill Battle
For years, Iran has projected influence in neighboring Iraq by backing an array of Shi'ite parties and militias -- some founded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
But its grip has loosened since the 2020 US killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. The sway Tehran once held over these groups has since eroded, giving way to infighting and fragmentation.
Shi'ite factions within the Coordination Framework -- a political alliance that includes Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani -- are now divided over US-backed efforts to disband the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of mostly Iran-aligned militias integrated into Iraq's army in 2016.
Several Shi'ite lists that once coordinated under Tehran's patronage are now running against each other, reflecting not only waning cohesion but a shift toward transactional, interest-driven politics rather than unified pro-Iran slates.
In a bid to contain those rivalries, Iran dispatched Soleimani's successor, Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, to Baghdad earlier in October. It remains unclear whether his mission succeeded.
"Iran does not have positive momentum and has been greatly diminished," Clarke said. "The way Israel ran roughshod over Iran and its proxies has likely led to creeping doubt among its supporters and patrons that the leaders may be less reliable than in the past."
Preventing Bad From Getting Worse
That erosion of influence is compounded by broader regional setbacks. Over the past two years, Israel has inflicted heavy damage on Iran's network and capabilities -- from decimating the military leadership of the US-designated Palestinian group Hamas and its infrastructure in Gaza to severely degrading Hezbollah and striking IRGC assets in Syria and inside Iran itself. The confrontation culminated in direct war in June, exposing major vulnerabilities on the Iranian side.
The weakening of Hezbollah and the IRGC's position in Syria ultimately contributed to the fall of President Bashar al-Assad, a key ally who allowed Iran to turn Syria into a land corridor linking its partners in Iraq and Lebanon.
For Tehran, Iraq now stands as the most immediate and indispensable anchor for regional deterrence and political leverage at a time when alternatives elsewhere in the Middle East are narrowing.
If the election results disappoint Tehran, Clarke expects persistence rather than retreat.
"Iran has the difficult task ahead of having to rebuild these proxy groups and dedicate more time, energy, and resources -- all of which are in short supply -- to keep the relationships strong," he said.
Iraq's vote is not just another election. It is a test of whether Iran can still shape outcomes in a region where its power is being steadily chipped away.
- By Frud Bezhan
What Israel's Unprecedented Strike In Qatar Means For Iran And The Region
The United States has spent years trying to convince Arab Gulf countries that normalization with Israel will stabilize the Middle East and contain the threat posed by Iran.
But Israel's brazen military strike in Qatar, a key US ally and home to the largest American military base in the Middle East, has threatened to upend the US-backed efforts.
The September 9 attack in central Doha, the Qatari capital, targeted the political leadership of US- and EU-designated Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. Six people were killed, including a member of Qatar's security services.
The strike has been widely condemned in Gulf capitals, where attitudes toward Israel have already soured over the country's direct conflict with Iran in June and its devastating war in the Gaza Strip.
The Gaza war was triggered by Hamas's terror attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, that killed some 1,200 people. The Palestinian group is believed to still be holding dozens of Israeli hostages.
"We're witnessing both a hardening of public opinion in the Gulf and growing unease among Gulf leaders over the perception that Israel is now acting without restraint -- ignoring red lines that were once respected," said Michael Horowitz, an independent analyst based in Israel.
It is unclear how the Gulf states will respond. Many are close US allies which depend on Washington for their security.
"This situation is distinct in one key respect: Israel is a close US ally," said Horowitz. "That changes the calculus. For Gulf leaders, the real concern may not be Israel alone, but the perceived absence of US leadership in setting limits or enforcing consequences. That gap is likely to shape how the Gulf states respond going forward."
Double-Edged Sword For Tehran
The attack in Qatar is a double-edged sword for Iran, Israel's archenemy, experts said.
"What happened strengthens Iran's narrative that Israel is a threat to the whole region and has nothing to do with [Tehran] and its allies in the axis of resistance," said Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
The so-called axis of resistance is Iran's regional network of proxies and armed groups -- which includes Hamas, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and Yemen's Huthi rebels -- against Israel and the United States.
Israel's attack in Qatar could also help deepen Iran's rapprochement with the Gulf states, which have previously had hostile relations with Tehran.
"At the same time, [the Qatar attack] increases the threat perception on the Iranian side," Azizi added. "That, if this is happening to Qatar, which is a major non-NATO ally of the US, then what is going to happen to us?"
During the 12-day war in June, Israel and the United States launched a bombing campaign targeting Iranian nuclear and military sites, killing some 1,000 people. Iran responded by firing missile barrages at Israel, killing several dozen people.
The cease-fire that ended the conflict is fragile, experts said, and the risk of renewed hostilities or a dangerous escalation remains high.
- By Kian Sharifi
Israeli Strike In Qatar Fuels Iranian Doubts Over Diplomacy
The shock of Israel’s first-ever strike on Qatari soil is reverberating in Tehran, where the attack is fueling doubts over the very purpose of negotiations with the West.
For many Iranian pundits, the timing of the strike -- hitting Hamas leaders as they allegedly reviewed a US-backed cease-fire and prisoner exchange proposal with Israel -- has reinforced suspicions that diplomacy is little more than a “trap.”
In the aftermath, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani told Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian that the targeted Hamas leaders were not only reviewing the US proposal but were also allegedly leaning toward accepting it.
Iranian hard-liners quickly seized on this detail.
The Tasnim news agency, an affiliate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), accused Israel of using “the mask of diplomatic negotiations” to attempt to assassinate Hamas leaders.
The agency, like many other conservative media outlets, noted that despite hosting the largest US military installation in the Middle East and signing contracts worth billions of dollars with the United States, Qatar was “unable to secure its own safety.”
Notably, even moderate and reformist commentators who support diplomacy with the West drew parallels to Israel’s June airstrikes on Iran, which occurred as Tehran and Washington were preparing for a new round of nuclear talks.
“It appears that America and Israel believe the purpose of missiles is to strike the negotiating table,” senior reformist figure Mohammad Ali Abtahi wrote on X. “They don’t like negotiations.”
Where Were The Air Defenses?
Qatar’s air defenses include Patriot missile batteries and the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system, both advanced US-made military hardware. Yet, Israeli missiles struck their target without a problem.
This has led some in Iran to claim that Qatar either ignored warnings of inbound missiles or its air defenses are entirely operated by the United States.
Masoud Barati, a hardline commentator, mocked Qatar on X for “not being control of its own air defenses.”
Some noted that Qatari air defenses intercepted Iranian missiles when Tehran attacked the Al Udeid Air Base -- where US Central Command (CENTCOM) forward headquarters is based -- in June in retaliation for the US bombing of its nuclear facilities.
Mehrdad Farahmand, a Middle East analyst based in Turkey, told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda that the air defenses did not detect the missiles “shows that America…had no objections to the attack.”
Farahmand said this raises major questions, given the extensive US-Qatar defense cooperation agreements.
Boon For Iran?
Some conservatives view the attack as a boon for Iran to raise its regional profile as a defender of sovereignty.
Political commentator Mohammad Hossein Khoshvaght said Arab states in the Middle East may recalibrate their policy toward Tehran and regard Iran with “more open eyes.”
Similarly, the IRGC-affiliated news website Mashregh argued that the attack allows Iran to strengthen its narrative in global public opinion.
It noted that Tehran can use the incident to bolster the so-called axis of resistance -- its regional network of proxies and armed groups -- against Israel.
The outlet added that this move “has not only further isolated Israel regionally and globally but also enhanced Iran’s position as a defender of national sovereignty and the axis of resistance across regional, diplomatic, military, and public opinion fronts.”
Despite the commentary against negotiating with the United States, Tehran seems keen on resuming talks, even if indirect, with Washington in a bid to prevent the return of UN sanctions, which could happen by the end of the month.
Reza Jamali of RFE/RL’s Radio Farda contributed to this report.
Iran Reports 21,000 Arrests During June War With Israel
Iranian police say they detained around 21,000 people for alleged security violations during the 12-day war with Israel in June, a figure far higher than earlier official estimates.
Police spokesman Saeed Montazerolmehdi said on August 12 that public tip-offs played a significant role in the arrests. It is unclear how many remain in custody.
Among those detained, 2,774 were foreign nationals accused of spying. Authorities claimed evidence on their phones showed suspicious activity such as images of military positions, key facilities, and transmitted location data. Another 261 people were suspected of espionage, while 172 were arrested for unauthorized filming.
The announcement contrasts sharply with late July comments from judiciary chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, who reported about 2,000 arrests during and after the conflict, saying many had been released after investigations cleared them of spying or collaboration with Israel.
Human rights groups have voiced alarm over the scale of the crackdown.
The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) documented hundreds of arrests during the conflict, often targeting ethnic minorities and activists. Amnesty International has condemned Iran’s post-war surge in executions, warning of torture, unfair trials, and arbitrary killings.
Since late June, Iran has executed at least seven people accused of spying for Israel, including nuclear scientist Rouzbeh Vadi on August 6.
Vadi, arrested over a year earlier, was accused of providing sensitive intelligence that aided Israeli operations.
Iranian authorities are concerned about deep infiltration by Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency, which has apparently enabled devastating military and intelligence operations inside the country.
In June, parliament passed a bill to sharply increase penalties for espionage and collaboration with hostile foreign governments, particularly Israel. Although the Guardian Council rejected the bill, a spokesman for the constitutional watchdog said that with amendments, it could still become law.
- By Ray Furlong and
- RFE/RL's Radio Farda
After The 12-Day War, Iran Turns To Veteran Politician Ali Larijani
As the Iranian authorities grapple with the aftermath of the June conflict with Israel and the United States, the return of veteran politician Ali Larijani as secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council marks something of a political comeback but was not unexpected.
After the war ended, the 67-year-old claimed that on the first day of the Israeli attacks, Iran's security apparatus had contacted him and demanded his resignation. Last year, Larijani was barred from running for president.
But he will now play a central role in shaping policy in the wake of Israeli and US bombing that exposed Iranian military vulnerabilities.
"Larijani was sidelined and disqualified, but he was never fully removed from the political scene," London-based Iranian political analyst Babak Dorbeigi told RFE/RL's Radio Farda.
"Several important developments occurred during the 12-day war. One major issue, as highlighted by officials in the media, was the miscalculation of Iran's defense capabilities," he added.
'Urgent Need For Change'
The Israeli and US strikes hit key military and nuclear targets, embarrassing Tehran as it appeared unable to defend itself effectively. Officials offered varying accounts of the scale of the damage incurred, creating an impression of chaos in the Iranian leadership.
"Yet the most critical issue -- one that takes precedence over all others -- was the realization that, in a time of war, the supreme leader (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) could not be relied upon," Dorbeigi said.
"His absence and Iran's lack of leadership exposed a major vacuum at the top. All of this points to an urgent need for change," he added.
In this telling, Larijani is a trusted figure capable of "rational decision-making." Seen as a pragmatist, he will work closely with Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian, who chairs the security body and is often regarded as pro-reformist.
But its decisions must still be approved by Khamenei.
"As long as Khamenei remains at the helm of the establishment, no strategic policy changes should be expected -- only tactical adjustments," Paris-based Iranian analyst Reza Alijani told RFE/RL.
"Larijani's role appears to be one of crisis management, which also includes managing compromise as Khamenei consistently avoids having any compromise attributed directly to him," he added.
Larijani has held this particular post before, from 2005-2007, later serving as speaker of the Iranian parliament until 2020. In this capacity, he gained international prominence backing the 2015 nuclear agreement with the United States and Britain, France, and Germany (known as the E3).
The first Trump administration walked away from that deal and Washington was in the process of negotiating with Tehran when Israeli air strikes began in June. The talks were abruptly broken off and have not resumed, with Tehran saying it cannot trust Washington and the White House questioning whether there is any merit in further talks given the damage caused to Iran's nuclear sites.
Following the conflict, Iran continued talks with the E3 and the European Union on July 25.
The E3 nations have warned that if a nuclear deal with Iran is not reached by the end of August, they will reinstate all UN sanctions against Iran by activating a so-called snapback mechanism of the 2015 nuclear deal.
Top Adviser On Nuclear Issues
Prior to his reappointment to the Security Council, Larijani was already Khamenei's top adviser on nuclear issues.
On July 20, he met Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin and "conveyed assessments of the escalating situation in the Middle East and around the Iranian nuclear program," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.
Months before the conflict with Israel and the United States, Larijani warned on Iranian TV that an attack would make Iran more likely to develop nuclear weapons. But since the attacks, Iranian officials have refrained from mentioning the subject, instead taking the line that Iran would continue uranium enrichment.
It's a distinction that Western powers don't accept, since Iran has been enriching uranium to a far higher degree than that needed for a civilian nuclear program.
Larijani's appointment came two days after Iran announced it was setting up a new Defense Council, under the supervision of the Security Council.
- By Kian Sharifi
Can Iran Exploit Sectarian Clashes To Regain A Foothold In Syria?
Amid deadly fighting between Druze fighters and Bedouin tribal militias in Syria’s southern province of Sweida, one question looms: can Iran use these sectarian clashes to reclaim the influence it built during a decade of civil war?
For years, Iranian commanders and their proxies underpinned Bashar al‑Assad’s government, turning Syria into a land corridor that linked allied groups in Iraq and Lebanon. But since the abrupt collapse of the Assad dynasty last December and the partial withdrawal of Russian forces, Tehran’s dominance has weakened.
Syria’s interim president, former rebel leader Ahmed al‑Sharaa, has struggled to rein in competing factions, creating openings -- and risks -- for Tehran in the south.
The recent violence erupted after the abduction of a Druze merchant and retaliatory kidnappings, which quickly spiraled into widespread bloodshed.
Both sides carried out attacks and reprisal killings.
When Syrian government forces intervened, they were accused of siding with the Bedouins, sparking direct clashes with Druze fighters and allegations of extrajudicial killings, looting, and arson in areas inhabited by the Druze, a religious minority long concentrated in southern Syria with a tradition of self-governance and ambivalent ties to the state.
A cease-fire brokered on July 19 between the government, Druze militias, and Bedouin tribes halted a week of fighting that killed more than 1,000 people. For now, that truce holds, but only tenuously.
Power Vacuums And Old Playbooks
Iran’s long‑standing strategy relies less on overt deployments and more on cultivating local militias and proxy commanders.
When violence flared in western Syria in March, some accused Tehran of stoking unrest, noting that several militia leaders had been trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
At the same time, Iranian officials have positioned themselves as defenders of Syrian sovereignty, condemning Israeli air strikes as “unhinged aggression” and warning against Western interference.
The aim is not purely military; it is also to rebuild political capital among Syrians exhausted by war and wary of foreign domination.
Yet Tehran faces steep obstacles. The Druze, who form the majority in Sweida, remain deeply distrustful of Iran and its Shi'ite proxies. Local Sunni tribes, locked in their own struggles, show little interest in outside patronage.
Challenges And Risks
Adding to these difficulties is Israel’s renewed assertiveness.
Since the fall of Assad’s government, Israeli forces have intensified strikes on suspected Iran‑aligned targets near the occupied Golan Heights, vowing to block any re‑entrenchment. Israeli officials have even framed some attacks on Syrian positions as protecting the Druze.
Complicating matters further is Syria’s fractured local landscape, where shifting loyalties and the rise of warlord rule make any Iranian gains volatile and short‑lived. Meanwhile, Iranian allies elsewhere -- particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon -- have been weakened by heavy losses in recent fighting with Israel.
Beyond Syria, Iran’s network of armed proxies has stepped up activity.
Houthi forces in Yemen recently ended months of calm in the Red Sea with strikes on two commercial vessels. In Iraq, Iran‑aligned militias are suspected of disrupting oil production in the Kurdistan region. And in recent months, Syrian forces and the Lebanese Army have intercepted multiple rocket shipments bound for Hezbollah, which has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and other Western countries.
These actions highlight Tehran’s resolve to sustain its proxy network as a core element of its deterrence strategy. Even if large, regular arms shipments are no longer feasible, Iran is intent on signaling that it remains influential and far from the weakened power some might assume.
For now, Tehran’s approach in Syria is likely to be incremental and indirect, shaped by dwindling resources and heightened scrutiny.
Rather than dramatic moves, it will lean on covert arms transfers and efforts to rebuild local alliances.
Yet as long as Israel is watching, Iran’s bid to reestablish a strong foothold in Syria will remain fraught and uncertain.
- By Kian Sharifi
Azerbaijan And Syria In A Plot Against Iran? Tehran Thinks So.
Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s visit to Baku last weekend highlighted a dramatic shift in regional alliances, prompting a mix of concern, suspicion, and strategic recalculation across Iranian media.
Official statements following Sharaa’s meeting with President Ilham Aliyev emphasized a new era in Syrian-Azerbaijani relations. Both leaders acknowledged past stagnation, directly blaming ousted President Bashar al-Assad’s “unfriendly policy” and pledged to restore and deepen cooperation.
Notably, the visit yielded a deal to export Azerbaijani gas to Syria via Turkey, with officials hailing the agreement as a needed remedy for Syria’s chronic energy crisis.
Meanwhile, various outlets, including Israeli media, claimed that Syrian and Israeli officials met on the sidelines of the trip. It’s unclear whether Sharaa attended the meeting, but the mere occurrence of such a meeting -- facilitated by Azerbaijan, Israel’s key ally in the region -- has further fueled concerns in Tehran.
Sharaa, a former insurgent known under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, joined forces with Turkish‑backed rebels and, in December 2024, led his Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS) faction in a lightning offensive that ultimately toppled the Iran‑ and Russia‑backed Assad government.
Security Challenges
A shared concern in Iranian media is what is seen as a shifting militant footprint from the Syrian battlefield to the Caucasus -- right on Iran’s doorstep.
Arman-e Melli, a pro-reform newspaper, argued that one aspect of the budding relationship between Damascus and Baku will involve the transfer of Syria-based fighters through Turkey into bases in Azerbaijan -- a potential development it described as a “mission” for Sharaa.
It speculated that their presence is meant to destabilize areas along the borders of Iran and Russia and to carry out operations targeting the broader axis of China, Russia, and Iran.
The conservative newspaper Farhikhtegan struck a similar tone, arguing that Sharaa sees the redeployment of his fighters to meet a US demand to expel foreign fighters from Syria. Under such a plan, the paper said, Azerbaijan would emerge as a strategic hub; either a staging ground for further infiltration into the Caucasus and Russia or a site for settlement in areas such as Karabakh.
A ‘Message’ To Iran
Israel’s i24NEWS network, citing an unnamed Syrian source, claimed that Israel and the United States had made decision for Baku to host a meeting between Israeli and Syrian officials to “send a message to Iran.”
Referencing the report, Iran’s state broadcaster-run Jam-e Jam newspaper charged that given Baku’s track record of alleged involvement in anti‑Iranian operations over the years, and suspicions about its cooperation with Israel during the last month’s war, this could well be taken as “clear evidence” that some neighboring countries are working with Israel against Iran.
Jam-e Jam specifically named Azerbaijan and its allies Turkey and Israel as the countries involved in “shaping new dynamics that work against Iran’s interests.”
The paper argued that ultimately Iran will need to safeguard its national interests with both diplomatic and security savvy, including strengthening ties with neighbors such as Armenia and Russia, and taking a firm stand against “Baku’s provocations.”
Tehran has watched with growing concern as Azerbaijan forges ever‑closer links with Israel.
In recent years, the partnership has significantly expanded, highlighted by deepening defense collaboration and Baku’s decision to open an embassy in Tel Aviv in 2023 -- developments that have only heightened Iranian mistrust.
Iran’s president, Masud Pezeshkian, last month pressed Aliyev to “investigate and verify” reports that Israeli drones, including micro‑drones, had crossed into Iranian airspace through Azerbaijani territory during the 12-day war the ended in a ceasefire on June 24.
Aliyev rejected the allegations, affirming that his government would never permit Azerbaijani territory to be used against Iran.
- By Kian Sharifi
Trump Says Iran Talks Scheduled As He Meets Netanyahu At White House
President Donald Trump hosted Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a private White House dinner on July 7 as the Israeli leader began a visit to Washington where he will meet US officials on the conflict in Gaza and Trump's diplomatic efforts with Iran in the wake of the US bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites.
Trump, who spoke with reporters as he, Netanyahu, and other US and Israeli officials gathered for the dinner, said he has agreed to an Iranian request to meet with US officials.
“We have scheduled Iran talks, and...They want to talk,” Trump said.
Special envoy Steve Witkoff, who attended the dinner with Trump and Netanyahu, said the meeting would take place soon, perhaps in a week. Netanyahu met earlier with Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
He plans to visit the US Capitol on July 8 to see congressional leaders, as well as Vice President JD Vance.
Trump said he is looking for a "permanent deal" with Iran and said he would like to lift US sanctions on the country at some point.
Trump also voiced confidence that Hamas was willing to end the conflict with Israel, saying he thinks "things are going along very well" in response to a question about what was preventing a peace deal for Gaza.
Netanyahu said the United States and Israel were working with other countries that would give Palestinians a "better future," suggesting that the residents of Gaza could move to neighboring nations.
Trump and Netanyahu met while Israeli officials held indirect negotiations with Hamas, which is backed by Iran, aimed at securing a US-brokered Gaza cease-fire and hostage-release deal.
Last month, the United States joined Israel in bombing three key Iranian nuclear sites, which Trump claims were “obliterated.” Tehran acknowledges the strikes caused significant damage, but it has vowed to press on with its nuclear program, especially its enrichment activities.
The Trump-Netanyahu meeting is seen as a victory lap for both leaders after what they describe as a significant setback for Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Netanyahu even said he has nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize for promoting peace efforts in multiple regions.
Israel launched its attack on Iran on June 13, just two days before Tehran and Washington were scheduled to hold a sixth round of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
Trump brokered a cease-fire shortly after joining Israel in bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities. While Trump has sent mixed signals about whether there is any point in striking a deal with Iran now given the state of its nuclear program. Sources told RFE/RL that a new round of talks will be held in Oslo, Norway, on July 10.
Trump has not elaborated on what a permanent deal might entail, but it suggests a shift from crisis management to a longer-term strategy: securing a comprehensive agreement that addresses Iran’s nuclear ambitions, regional activities, and the broader security architecture of the Middle East.
Iran has not publicly commented on whether a new round of talks will be held, but Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian told US media personality Tucker Carlson that his country can “very easily resolve differences” with the United States through diplomacy.
He also accused Netanyahu of “torpedoing” diplomacy by launching strikes on Iran “in the middle of talks with the United States.”
Pezeshkian said there was a lack of trust in Washington and that Tehran needs assurances that Israel “will not be given permission again to attack us.”
Netanyahu has not publicly commented on the United States resuming talks with Iran, but he has consistently taken a hard-line stance against diplomacy with Tehran, emphasizing military deterrence over diplomatic engagement.
The Israeli prime minister has advocated for a "Libya-style agreement," which would involve the dismantling of Iran’s entire nuclear program -- a nonstarter for Tehran.
New Satellite Images Show Activity At Iran's Fordow Nuclear Site 1 Week After US Bombings
Former US national security adviser John Bolton says Netanyahu will likely convey to Trump that Iran’s nuclear program can still be a threat.
“I think certainly the Israeli view is going to be that the Iranian nuclear program has been very severely damaged, but it can be reconstructed and remains a threat,” he told RFE/RL in an interview on July 7.
“That is something that for Israel is obviously existential.”
With Iran’s nuclear program damaged but not dismantled, and diplomacy hanging in the balance, Trump may see an opening to shift the dynamic. Having backed Netanyahu militarily by joining the strikes on Iran -- something Netanyahu has long pushed for -- Trump could now press for diplomatic space in return.
After delivering on Netanyahu’s terms, he may argue that it’s time for Israel to support a deal that serves his own.
With reporting by Zoriana Stepanenko, Reuters, AP, and AFP
- By Kian Sharifi
12 Days Of War: Takeaways From The Israel-Iran Conflict
After 12 days of unprecedented direct hostilities, Israel and Iran have agreed to a cease-fire that has brought a tense and uneasy calm to the region.
The war, marked by devastating air strikes, missile barrages, and covert operations, has left both countries reeling. While the immediate fighting has stopped, the political, military, and nuclear implications of this brief but intense war are only beginning to unfold.
Both countries have rushed to claim success, with the Israelis insisting they accomplished their goals and the Iranians claiming to have “imposed” the cease-fire on their archfoe.
Yet beneath the official statements, analysts warn that the cease-fire is fragile, the strategic balance has shifted, and the risk of renewed conflict or dangerous escalation remains high.
Israel's Gains, And A Critical Omission
Israel’s government declared it had “achieved all the objectives of Operation Rising Lion,” citing the reported destruction of key Iranian nuclear and missile sites, the elimination of senior military leaders, and air superiority over Tehran.
“Israel was able to strike key military strategic governmental targets quite effectively,” Farzan Sabet, a managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told RFE/RL.
He said the conflict highlighted the extent of the Israeli infiltration of Iran’s security apparatus, adding the country's intelligence agency Mossad "was able to basically create a legion of defectors who were probably one of the elements in this war that caused the greatest damage.”
Butm despite Israeli and US bombings, Iran’s nuclear program, while damaged, is not completely dismantled -- some enrichment capacity and expertise survived, and the risk of a covert Iranian nuclear breakout remains.
Nuclear nonproliferation expert and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution Robert Einhorn noted that more than 400 kilograms of Iran’s uranium stockpile enriched to 60 percent purity had been moved and had not been accounted for.
“Conceivably, if under Iran's possession, [the stockpile] could be taken to some secret location and used in a nuclear weapons program,” Einhorn told RFE/RL.
Iran's Weakened Position And Shattered Prestige
Iran’s leadership survived, but at a steep price. Its nuclear, missile, and drone arsenals were severely degraded; much of its senior military leadership was killed; its air defenses failed to protect the country from deep Israeli strikes; and the Islamic republic finds itself politically weakened.
Sabet called it “a catastrophe for Iran,” while Einhorn said, “Iran is weaker and more internationally isolated than it was two weeks ago.”
The Islamic republic’s claim as a guarantor of national security, a key pillar of its legitimacy, has been badly damaged given its inability to stave off Israeli air attacks and protect its military leadership, which was mostly eliminated on the first day of war.
“It’s a massive blow to the prestige of [the Islamic republic],” Sabet said.
The Nuclear Dilemma: Deterrence Or Restraint?
The war’s most dangerous legacy may be the incentive it gives Iran to pursue nuclear weapons. Iran has previously said that, while it does not seek nuclear weapons, it will reconsider its doctrine if it faces an existential threat.
Before And After: The Iranian Nuclear Sites Targeted By US Air Strikes
The war sends mixed signals to Iran’s leadership. Some Iranian factions may see the attacks as a warning not to cross the nuclear threshold. But with its deterrent eroded, others may view nuclear arms as the only reliable guarantee of the Iranian establishment’s survival.
“The pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability can be very, very risky for the country,” Einhorn said. “There will be hard-liners in Iran who will decide that the only way of deterring foreign attacks...is acquiring nuclear weapons. And it's not clear at this stage which of those groups will prevail.”
But Sabet is skeptical of Iran’s technical and organizational capacity to pull off a covert nuclear breakout, not least because of how compromised it is.
“I wouldn't put much trust with a system as thoroughly infiltrated and unreliable and incompetent as the Islamic republic,” he said, adding that if Iran were to conduct a nuclear test, “we could see nuclear escalation against Iran, which I think is highly dangerous.”
A Fragile Pause, But Not A Lasting Peace
The cease-fire has brought a tenuous pause to the fighting. Israel can claim a military victory, but the political and strategic endgame remains unsettled.
The Islamic republic is battered and its deterrence eroded, but it survives -- at least for now.
Israel may have won the battle, but the war’s core dilemmas -- nuclear risk, regional instability, and mutual mistrust -- remain unresolved.
According to Einhorn, only diplomatic efforts can ensure that Iran’s nuclear material is truly accounted for and that the region steps back from the brink.
"The missing 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium...could become the basis of a covert nuclear weapons program," he said. "And this element cannot be dealt with by a military attack. It can only be dealt with through diplomacy."